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 Abstract 
 
The purpose of this project is to examine the escalation of the ongoing conflict in Syria, 
which began in 2011. It started with a peaceful protest against the Assad regime, after it 
developed into a bloody civil war within one year. To get an understanding to the 
question why the situation escalates in the way it did, there will be an analysis of three 
main factors: the ethnic and religious division of the Syrian society, the relationship 
between Syrians and its government framed as a (pathologic) trust relation and the 
involvement of different external actors. By conducting a multi-dimensional analysis of 
the conflict, we are able to deal with the complexity of the events. In combination, each 
of the three identified factors is heavily contributing to the escalation. Consequently, we 
emphasis especially on the inter play of the domestic and global factors.  
  
  
 
 
– The Crowd is Untruth – 
Søren Kierkegaard 1992 [1847] 
 
 
 
The spark of protest, different in intensity and in regions, reflected the multitude of 
accumulated grievances; 
―In Dera, formerly a base of the Ba‟ath, where it began, the loss of work opportunities 
in Lebanon, corruption and drought had encouraged Salafism among unemployed 
youth; then, tribal reaction against the arrest of tribal youth and the extreme 
overreaction of the security forces, which Asad declined to call to account, ignited the 
tinder. In Banyas, demonstrations started against the ban on the niqab in schools; in 
Latakia, against an Alawi mafia-like grouping, the Shabiha. All had in common an 
element of reaction to the neglect of areas outside the main urban centres.‖  
Raymond Hinnebusch (2012) 
 
 
1 
Motivation  
 
Our motivation to study the conflict in Syria is certainly rooted in its actuality and in its 
global impact. Furthermore, we pursue to get a greater insight into the recent event, and 
to seek a deeper understanding into this matter than the media coverage does. It will 
provide us with a greater insight of the situation. Societal upheavals might be one of the 
most interesting social phenomenon existing. Large parts of society are moved by a 
collective effervescence. The so far established social norms do not function anymore, 
and despite of that people start protesting. Therefore, we are interested in the question, 
which factors leads to the breakout of the first peaceful conflict. Due to our background 
in global sociology, we are driven by the interest of the interaction of local and global. 
condition in the Syrian case.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem field 
Since 2010, a series of upheavals have shaken the Middle East. The Arab Spring has 
changed the political and social landscape of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Though, 
the first three countries still struggle with the aftermath of the upheavals – observers 
now speak from an ‗Arab Winter‘. These countries situation, in contrast to Syria‘s did 
not escalate to a full-scale civil war. Here, the situation is devastating: more than 
100.000 casualties are to bemoan, approximately 1.2 million houses are destroyed and 
up to eight million individuals are displaced. Crimes against humanity and civilian – 
committed by both the Assad
1
 regime as well as by different opposition groups – have 
become a daily reality for the people of Syria (ICG 2013a).  
Syria as a multi-ethnic and religious society – consisting of groups of Sunni-Muslim 
Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Assyrian, Druze, Alawites and Christians – has during its history 
been an arena for controversies between those groups. Looking through history, one will 
notice the trace of ethnic and religious conflicts. Before the independence of Syria, the 
French colonial power used the strategy of fragmentation of the society to rule it. This 
policy leaves its mark in the development of the Syrian social structure, redeployed and 
was carried on by those two al-Assad regimes (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008). 
Ethnic and religious elements in interaction with historical issues – like the failing of 
the state to unify the nation and unequal power distribution – play a significant role for 
the escalation of the current conflict. Occurrence of the conflict has increased the risk of 
an ethnic as well as religious clash, for instance between different ethnic groups. The 
conflict‘s extend is still threatening the stability of other Muslim countries in the region. 
It has attracted and involved many internal and external actors attention, among them 
different (global) jihadists groups, that is why many actors‘ interest is at stake. The 
regime as well as oppositional groups – by the help of externals‘ support – fighting each 
other in different fronts (Reese 2013). A multi-layered conflict, in which ordinary 
Syrian‘s fighting against the regime, Sunnis fight Alawites, Islamists attacking non-
                                                 
1
 Different sources adopt different ways to write Arab names. We are aware of this differences and 
decided to write the name ‗Assad‘ with double 's' throughout the project. 
 3 
Muslims as well as regime appeared. The fact that Bashar al-Assad belongs to the 
Alawite sect has led to the perception that Alawites in general, are supporters of the 
regime. Ethnic diversity and religious controversy as two fundamental issues have 
obviously effected groups‘ relation, especially between Alawites and Sunnis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood to other Syrian religious-minority groups. For example, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has a strong agenda for the Syrian society. They insist upon Islam 
as the state's religion, ―regardless of how this affected the Christian and Jewish 
minorities and the susceptibilities of other minorities such as the Druze, Alawite and 
Ismaelite sects living in Syria” (Ziadeh 2011: 135). By seeing differences and 
controversies between groups and their relation to each other a picture of a divided 
national identity will appear. After the break out of the uprising and regime‘s 
overreaction, the protest movement changed its character, and the whole situation 
became more violent. The opposition groups start to fight the regime by grasping 
weapons and also committing violence.  
Since then, opposition groups mobilizing troops and attack regime forces, but they 
are divided in their strategy. The lack of a unified Syrian opposition and the absence of 
strong political parties are some of the major problems challenging the Syrian 
opposition. They had not a clear and unified resolution for phasing out the conflict and 
forming a new future for Syria. For instance, 
 
―Kurdish groups have not had a strong affinity with the other opposition groups. 
This is partly due to lack of trust between the Kurds and Arabs in Syria. The Arab 
nationalist indoctrination in Syria has played an important role in deepening the 
mistrust between the two societies, while small Kurdish groups aspiring for either 
political autonomy or to merge with the regional Kurds to establish a greater 
Kurdistan have also created suspicion among the Arab population vis-à-vis the 
Kurds.‖ (Ulutas 2011: 97) 
 
The political opposition seems to be not able to find a compromise, something which 
the numerous armed groups definitely cannot do. The data let us assume that after the 
escalation of the conflict the political influence of the armed groups increased rapidly. 
For some historical reasons forming and establishing a unified opposition group, 
consisting of both Islamists, nationalists, liberals and Kurds fighting against the regime 
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of Bashar al-Assad is becoming an impossible process. Furthermore, the opposition 
currently faces lack of strong coordination and establishment of a unified front between 
internal and external opposition (ibid: 98f.).  
Moreover, numbers of different Salafi-jihadist groups entering Syrian are rising. The 
conventional wisdom seems to be that these combatants all fight for the same goal: 
establishing an Islamic world state under Islamic law. ―Islamist insurgents, like all 
insurgents, seek to control the government, need money and weapons, and thrive where 
government is weak. Yet Islamist insurgents also possess their own distinct 
characteristics‖ (Byman 2013: 354). Observers express great fear that despite of the 
differences these forces will succeed because the units are hold together by the binding 
force of ideology (respectively religion).  
What linked this regional specific reason to protest was the fatigue of the people to 
believe the forty years long lasting reign of the Assad-clan can bring a fundamental 
improvement of the life conditions. This overall doubt is reflected in the fragile people-
government relation. 
The conflict becomes more escalated by the contribution of other elements. External 
factors and actors in interaction have an impact on both the duration and the direction of 
the conflict. External elements like; international interference, the interests of the 
dominants and regional powers are among some of those issues that make the conflict 
more complicated. Syria seems to becoming an arena for interest of regional actors 
maneuvering trajectory for branding their agenda and ideology. Therefore, it seems to 
us that finding a peacefully solution for the conflict will need a long term solution.    
To explain, why the protest did not cumulated in the overthrow of the regime like it 
was the case in the other countries of the Arab Spring, and why it changed character – 
from a peaceful movement to a regulate civil war – we identify three major factors for 
the escalation of the conflict in Syria: the first one is the ethnic constituency of the 
Syrian society, the second is the pathologic government-people relationship, and finally, 
the third factor is the influence of foreign forces.  
Those three mentioned factors are among some of the most striking issues we 
encountered during processing our data. Common feature for these elements is that all 
of them – either as a single factor or in interaction with each – have had affected the 
escalation of the conflict. From the idea we have got about the evolution of the 
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situation, we assume that the three elements are the most challenging factors for the 
conflict. They affect the situation‘s extension, limiting capabilities of the opposition in 
Syria, the regimes willingness to compromise and finding a peaceful resolution for the 
conflict. 
In view of the above, we have proposed the following problem formulation. 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
After getting an idea of the situation in Syria, we want to understand how this trouble-
prone society suddenly slithers into a conflict of the scale it has today. Which actors and 
factors cause the bloody outbreak and why did it happen to this exact time and not 
already before? To develop an understanding of the conflict and its conditions, we will 
examine the following problem formulation and sub-research question: 
 
―How can elements of ethnicity, people-government relation and the role of 
external actors give an understanding for the escalation of the Syrian 
conflict?‖ 
 
1.3 Sub-research Questions 
From the problem formulation we have developed the following research-question 
divided into three sub-questions: 
 
1. How does divided ethnic and religious identity in Syria, affect the ongoing 
conflict?    
2. How does the government-people relation, influence the escalation of the 
conflict? 
3. How do external actors do contribute to the Syrian conflict? 
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Chapter 2. Methodology  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe what methodology we use in this project. The 
first section is an introduction and mapping the used empirical data. Further on, we 
provide a section in which we describe the theoretical approach used in the project. 
2.1 Project Structure 
 
Own creation 2013 
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Description of Project's Structure 
Introduction 
In the first chapter we already stated the problem field our case is embedded in, 
formulate our problem formulation and differentiated it into three sub-research 
questions. In the second chapter we will continue with the methodology used in the 
project. Here, we explain the validity and reliability of the used empirical data and 
describe what understanding of the process of making scientific findings we follow. 
Afterwards, we briefly summarize the theoretical approaches we use to analyze the 
available data. We do not add a whole theoretical chapter, because we combine the 
analysis with theoretical notions. 
 
Analysis 
The third chapter follows the analysis, which is divided into three sections. In the first 
section, we investigate the role of ethnic diversity of the Syrian society for the 
escalation of the conflict, the second is about the government-people relation and 
finally, the third about the role international actors play. 
 
Discussion, Conclusion and Perspective 
In the successional chapter four, we discuss the outcome of the analysis. In the 
following conclusive chapter, we provide an answer to our research-questions, the final 
chapter contents a further perspective of the situation in Syria and propose 
contaminative questions for further projects. 
 
2.2 Method and Empirical Data 
The following describes our methodological reflections on the analysis of our empirical 
data. This project starts with the intention to look at the conflict in Syria, starting with 
the uprising against Bashar al-Assad and his regime in April 2011. A further intention 
was to gain an understanding on why the conflict continues without an end in sight. As 
the events are fairly recent or even ongoing, the empirical data in the field is therefore 
new and to some extend have an importance for the project. The empirical data is based 
on journalistic and analytical reports as well as on academic articles. The core of the 
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data is taken from reports published by the International Crisis Group (ICG).
2
 The 
empirical material is rich and dense enough to serve as data for our project. Before we 
deepen the discussion of the data, we first, state our understanding of the process of 
making scientific findings. 
 
2.2.1 Inductive Case Study 
To follow the goal of the project, we use an empirical-inductive approach. In doing so, 
we make a decision about how we acquire knowledge about the world (Bryman 2008: 
55).  
The empirical-inductive method does not have a logically valid end, which means 
that the conclusion that will be presented in the end of the project mirrors the reality of 
the situation in Syria. Because we know that the reality of the conflict is multilayered, a 
conclusion can never be final. Therefore, an inductive argument's conclusion can easily 
be ‗false‘ while the premises are true – such an outcome does not necessarily need to be 
a contradiction. That is the case, because we cannot consider all existing factors in our 
analysis. Furthermore does the environment constantly change. This lack of certainty 
does not mean that the method cannot be a reliable instrument. The inductive approach 
is consistent with the project‘s aim, as the conflict in Syria is a current conflict. It is 
difficult (and not helpful) to provide a definitive conclusion, because the situation, as 
we already mentioned, can easily change.  
The empirical-inductive method, in general, is a method that can be used to provide 
hypothesis and theories. In this way, we have the possibility to keep an open eye for the 
discovery of new hypotheses or theories. Consequentially, these hypotheses and theories 
can then be used to make further predictions or explanations. By using hypotheses and 
theories to examine a social phenomenon empirical consequences derive. An empirical 
consequence is a claim arising from a hypothesis, which truth can be determined by 
direct observation. These empirical consequences can be compared with the facts 
(empirical data). This makes it possible to confirm (verify) or disprove (falsify) the 
hypotheses or theories. Therefore, it is a method to justify new hypotheses or theories 
(ibid). In consequence, being led by the available empirical data and not by theoretical 
thoughts only enables us to assure to work close to the social phenomenon. Therefore, it 
                                                 
2
 For further information: http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
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is important to have a robust research design, in order to link the collected data in a 
meaningful way to the initial question of the study (Yin 2003: 19). 
 
Furthermore, the project has elements of a case study. According to Yin, a case study is 
the preferred strategy when 'why' or, which is the case here, 'how' questions are being 
posed (ibid: 1). Moreover, it is the best strategy, for analyzing complex social 
phenomena – such as conflicts. Applying a case study allows us, to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (ibid: 2). Case study follows the 
notions of a logical analysis and theoretical generalization. Therefore, we do not apply 
one generalized theory and selected representative empirical data prepared an analysis 
in which either the empirical data can strengthen, weaken or nuance – with more cases 
with the same result can strengthen or weaken the theory. Instead of using one main 
theory to explain why the protest in Syria escalated, we use three middle range theories 
(Merton 1968). This access fits in line with what we want to find out in Syria. By 
allying the chosen theories to the empirical data, we will seek an answer to the 
formulated problem (Bryman 2008: 52ff.). Bryman further argues, that case studies 
which tend to take an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research, use predominantly a qualitative research strategy (ibid: 55).  
In the case study literature several ways of presenting the data are mentioned (Yin 
2003: 152ff.). We are not following a specific one, but present the data iteratively, 
following the different theoretical approaches, which look at the data from different 
perspectives. We, therefore, do not just renarratate the events but deconstruct them. 
 
Following Bryman, one major critic of case study is that findings deriving from it 
cannot be generalized (Bryman 2008: 57). This criticism mainly is raised by scholars 
using quantitative methods. Through, they are right in some extend, it is not the aim we 
have by applying a case study. We do not want to give a general answer, but we want to 
answer a very specific question. 
 
2.2.2 Validity and Reliability Criteria for Empirical Data 
In addition to the way of presentation, relevance, validity and reliability are the overall 
criteria we have taken cover in the choice of our empirical data. 
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By using secondary data, the question of representativeness always needs to be 
considered. Our material reflects different forms of representation. The reports we use 
are mainly compiled by the International Crisis Group (ICG). The ICG is an 
independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization. The group provides in-
depth reports of all crisis regions of the world. Among other NGO's and scholars the 
group is well known and respected for their professional work. Their authors do not 
only describe their own experiences, but also conduct interviews with state officials, 
scholars and other intellectuals, journalists and citizens. Furthermore, they evaluate 
available sources. Therefore, we believe the material reflects different views and 
opinions. The reports we use for our own analysis where published between July 2011 
and October 2013. Hence, they cover the situation from the very beginning until recent 
events. Although, the data provided by the ICG can be considered as representative, it 
has a certain bias. As the organization states, it is committed to prevent and resolve 
deadly conflicts. Therefore, the reports have always a focus towards a possible solution 
of the conflict. A further criticism aims at the funding structure. Circa half of the annual 
capital comes from Western governments and companies. The ICG had to deal with 
allegation of representing a certain Western world view and following Western 
interests. 
 
To complete the picture, we mix the ICG reports with academic articles analyzing the 
present or past situation in Syria. Given these facts, we believe that the sources are an 
adequate and reliable database. Therefore, we have no reason to impose additional 
material or survey own data.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches 
As one can see, we do not provide a discrete chapter where we point out the used 
theories. Therefore, we will provide a brief introduction of how the analysis is built 
around the applied theories and the available data. We have been very conscious in our 
choice of theoretical approaches. From an early stage on, we were aware that one major 
theory could not provide the insight we want to reach. Resulting from this strategy, we 
were challenged to pick the right theories to get the best answers out of the data 
(Bryman 2008: 57). Of course, many other ways to analyze the conflict in Syria exists. 
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We could apply approaches dealing with political violence or social movement, also we 
could focus only on economic factors or on micro-phenomenon. We are not doing so, 
because the challenge always is, to provide one dimensional answers to a multi-
dimensional problem. The analysis will be the centerpiece of this project. By using 
different theories, we will look at the data from different perspectives to get an as 
complete picture as possible. 
 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
In the first analytical section – regarding effect of divided ethnic and religious identity 
for emerging conflict – Donald L. Horowitz‘s theory of Ethnic Group in Conflict 
(Horowitz 1985) will be employed as a main theory. According to Horowitz ethnic 
conflict is becoming a worldwide phenomenon for the previous and the current century. 
All over the globe widespread ethnic conflicts since the end of the World War II have 
claimed millions of human lives. Ethnicity is during one of the dominant sources of 
creating international tension and challenging the cohesion of states (ibid).  
Horowitz‘s theory attempts to answer such general questions as; what sources cause 
ethnic conflicts, why they emerge, what is the impact of ethnic affiliations in escalating 
conflict, what is the role of military in direction and outcome of ethnic conflict? (ibid: 
xii).  
Historical heritage is one of the main roots of conflict between ethnic groups. In case 
of occurrence of domestic conflict fragmented nation-states are more likely to 
experience different degrees of conflict. Horowitz claims that in finding answer for why 
domestic conflicts emergence, different aspects of multi-ethnicity, among them; the size 
and the number of the largest group and minority group, historical relation between 
groups, societies political ethnic structures, and ethnic affinities may be taken into 
account (ibid). 
 
In general, Horowitz‘s theory of ethnicity has the necessary capacity and notions for 
giving a broad understanding of why ethnic conflicts emerge and escalate. We are going 
to supply Horowitz‘s theoretical understanding because of striking forms of change in 
the international community, relation between states and their impact on each other, 
rapid and extending globalization and emerging new trends and ideologies – among 
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them global Islamism. 
 
The Trust-Relation Approach 
Trust is subject of interests not only in sociology but also in other disciplines dealing 
with the relation of people (for example psychology or economics). It is a basic need for 
the living together in a society: ―Trust is both a human passion and a modality of 
human action: a more or less consciously chosen policy for handling the freedom of 
other human agents or agencies‖ (Dunn 2000: 73). Not only on the micro-level, also on 
the systemic (macro) level, is trust crucial for a functional society. In other words, trust 
can be seen as a bet on one unknown future, in which the actors hope to get a benefit out 
of it. The risk of trusting in someone or something is that the benefit might not occur or 
even worse, one suffers a detriment. That is why, trust needs to meet some requirements 
– otherwise cooperation will not happen. 
To understand trust-relations, it is important to differentiate between different kinds 
of trust: social and institutional trust. Without individual social trust it is impossible to 
build cooperative social relations, hence to build an effective and legitimate 
government. In the same time, without a flourishing civil society and a 'good' 
government, it is difficult to build a sustainable trust-relation within the nation (Newton 
2001). In Syria, the lack of social trust and political capital on the one hand, and 
effective and legitimate government on the other are close related. 
 
Hegemony and International Relation 
We conceptualize Robert Cox‘s understanding of hegemony which is based on 
Gramsci‘s notion. Hegemony in his sense means domination of a ruling class by 
presenting specific definitions of reality that is accepted by the nation as an 
unquestionable fact and a common sense. Gramsci emphasizes on important role of state 
in international relations as it is sphere were social conflict happens (Cox 2005: 41). 
―The basic challenge in international relations and world order, which are observed as 
changes in the military strategic and geo-political balance, are observed as changes in 
social relations‖ (ibid). Unlike great powers, weak states have less autonomy to 
determine their foreign policies, because the economy of these nations is controlled by 
and interwove with economies of powerful nations. In this regards hegemony also 
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means the dominance of one state over other countries. This is why hegemony is used as 
a euphemism for imperialism. 
International hegemony is not just an order among states, ―it is an order within world 
economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and 
links into other subordinate modes of production‖ (ibid). It is also matter of social 
relations among different countries that connect social classes in the world. Hence, we 
can describe world hegemony as a combination of social, economic, and political 
structures all together – and not just one of these – that is expressed in universal norms, 
institutions and mechanisms. It determines universal rules for states and social 
organizations that act internationally (ibid). 
 
Game Theory 
Vast impacts of Globalization on the international relations has caused more influence 
and interference of great powers in the weak states‘ internal affairs. Game theory 
exhibits the great powers‘ political and ideological position and their interactions over 
specific concerns for their interests. This approach is based on the assumption that 
actors make their rational decisions in a competition situation. The International actors 
try to have more benefits and minimize their losses in their intervention in internal 
affairs of weak states – especially when there is a social conflict. Under uncertain social 
and political conditions players estimate the probabilities, and consider what the other 
actors do (Beavis 2013). In this two-side n-actor game – just like any other game – one 
side ‗wins‘ and one side ‗loses‘. 
Game theory is often used as model to see how competitive actors in an anarchic 
situation can have collaboration for instance individual state as an actor may collaborate 
with another one for a better rational decision making.  
 
2.3.1 Conflict Cycle Model 
In order to have a better understanding of the ongoing conflict in Syria we introduce a 
model in this section, which helps us to divide the conflict into different phases: the 
conflict cycle model by Hugh Miall's (Thruelsen 2009: 15ff.).
3
 The phases will give a 
better understanding and a vocabulary to examine the causes and influential factors for 
                                                 
3
 The following description of the Conflict Cycle Model is taken from Thruelsen 2009. 
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the brake out of the conflict. The conflict cycle shows features and elements of five 
phases a conflict may pass through. We are aware that not all conflicts may go through 
the phases in the same direction or following the sequences in the same way. For 
example, it is possible that in reality a conflict jumps from mobilization directly to post 
conflict. In the same time, the model helps us to categorize the different phases of the 
conflict. 
 
Figure 2. Conflict Cycle Model 
 
Thruelsen 2009 
 
Potential Conflict 
The first phase refers to the structural factors and social conditions in a society that 
could cause a social dissatisfaction and the possible emergence of a conflict. Factors as, 
poverty, religious disagreements, relative and actual deprivation, an ethnicity or specific 
cultural factors can be examples of such conditions. Nonetheless, many societies might 
have to deal with similar issues, but they do not compellingly have to lead to a mass 
mobilization. Since its foundation, the Syrian state has dealt with many vulnerabilities. 
The potential of an open conflict was always omnipresent. Only the ruthless rule of the 
Assad-clan and their extensive use of the security forces prevent society from revolting 
against the government. 
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Gestation of Conflict 
In the second phase, the conflict is not yet shaped, but some mobilizations already take 
place. Political, ethnic, religious or cultural groups express their dissatisfaction with the 
current regime. In this phase, the protest slogans usually ask for reforms and not to 
topple the regime. Now, the state's ability to manage a conflict is questioned. Until now, 
the state‘s legitimacy may not be questioned in general. Depending on what strategy the 
government and its executive apply now, the growing conflict can either be curtailed or 
fueled. If the government is willing to curtail the conflict, it need to react carefully and 
should prevent further complexities. For the case of Syria, it is safe to say, that the 
regime acted in a disproportionate manner. The protesters demands aim at moderate 
reforms and – at first – not against the regime itself. Furthermore, the impact of the 
uprising in other Arab countries – along with the specific grievances in the different 
regions in Syria – has been important for the mobilization. To this point of time, most 
ordinary citizens were not desperate enough to risk their lives in the streets. The 
majority of people waited and observed how the situation will develop. 
 
Mobilization of Conflict 
In the following phase of the conflict, the course for the conflict‘s future is set. If a 
conflict reach this phase, it is difficult to return to ‗normality‘. The state has a number of 
strategies to manage the situation: giving more freedom to the oppressed groups which 
caused the mobilization, a fairer distribution of wealth or political participation. If the 
state does not apply such strategies or the protesters do not believe in an improvement, a 
clash between oppositional groups and the government is likely. Now, the confrontation 
becomes more rigid and the oppositional forces become organized. The fronts are 
hardening. We can observe this development in Syria. After the government rejected the 
first protests in a brutal way, more and more citizens decide to join the protests. The 
society becomes increasingly polarized and the aim of the protest changed towards 
toppling Assad. 
 
Armed Conflict 
A state and its society enter this stage, when the opposition has not received proper 
response to their demands from the state. Now, it is very likely that violence comes to 
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its extreme and might turn the conflict to an armed conflict, which easily can result in a 
human crisis. In this phase, providing the people‘s demands might not satisfy the angry 
crowd anymore. They raise the stakes and are serious about changing the regime. The 
state‘s legitimacy is questioned, not only by its citizens, but also by other nations. 
Furthermore, the interference of other nations or groups seeking their own benefits can 
make the conflict more complex. As it is the case in Syria, the influence of foreign 
actors highly influences the events there. If an armed conflict brakes out, the normal life 
collapses and depending on its dimension, either the whole state or just single regions 
are infected by combats. One major question in this phase is which side can provide 
itself best with international support and material supplies.   
 
Post Conflict 
In the post conflict phase, peace is not absolutely assured as the conflict may escalate 
again. A structural peace making process archived by the government and international 
organizations can appease the situation. Though, peace cannot be settled easily for the 
hatred, distrust and other problems resulted from the conflict. However, it is important 
to eliminate the violence: ―In this phase, elements such as demobilization, disarmament 
and reintegration programs are implemented, as well as support for political 
institution-building, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing troops, demonstration 
processes, security sector reform (…) promoting human rights, demining and mine 
awareness‖ (Thruelsen 2009: 19). The Syrian conflict does not have reached this stage. 
The international community tries to find a solution but failed so far. 
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Chapter 3. Analysis 
 
So far, we set the methodological grounds for our analysis. The analysis is divided into 
three sections and it is built around the three sub-questions. Every analysis-section will 
provide an insight into why the Syrian conflict escalated. For helping the reader to 
follow the analysis, we have divided each section into several thematic paragraphs.  
We start with the first factor for the escalation, which is the ethnic and religious 
division of the Syrian society. In the second section we analyze the trust-relation 
between the Syrian people and the government. After we examine two factors located in 
the Syrian society, we focus on various foreign actors and factors in the third part.  
 
3.1 Divided National, Ethnic Identity and Religious Dissensus  
The following section deals with notions of divided national, ethnic identity and 
religious dissent, the first identified elements caused escalation of the Syrian conflict. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that divided ethnic identity and religious 
dissent are some of the most dominant elements for the escalation of the conflict. In 
general, states and societies characterized by multi-ethnicity and religious contention 
are more prone to civil war than societies characterized by ethnic and religious 
homogeneity (Horowitz 1985). We will look deeper into; how and by which degree 
elements of divergent ethnicity and religious dissent had affected the escalation, 
extension and duration of the Syrian conflict. As main theory, in this analytical sector, 
we make use of Donald L. Horowitz‘s theory of Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) and 
supplement it by some other theoretical notions concerning religion and culture. 
 
Zeynep Bulutgil notes that in societies where ethnic tensions are deep, the relations 
between different ethnic groups are more strained, and question of who should be or not 
be the dominant ethnic group over others, it is a relevant political issue outshining the 
political system. An organic nationalism, regarding ethnic minorities as inherently 
different and deserving of exclusion, rather than a civic nationalism is one of the main 
outcome of this sort of society construction (as Quoted by  Chenoweth and Lawrence 
2010: 57). To understand the notion of ethnicity and what it means to be an ethnic group 
we employ Horowitz‘s definition of ethnicity: ―Ethnicity is based on a myth of 
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collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some 
notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from 
the concept of ethnicity‖ (Horowitz 1985: 52). According to this definition, divergence 
ethnicity is among one of the dominant sources of creating national as well as 
international tension and challenging the cohesion of states. The modern world has 
witnessed differentiated kinds of ethnic conflicts during the last half century, which 
makes ethnic conflict a recurrent phenomenon in many cases (ibid: xi-5).  
 
The Protests Background  
It is necessary to mention some factual information to give an insight into how brutal 
the conflict is to map and identify the extend of the situation. Out of a total population 
of 20 to 22 million Syrians there have been more than four to five million internally 
displaced, and according to UN crimes against humanity and civilian have become a 
daily reality for the people of Syria. Crimes against civilian are committed by both the 
Assad regime as well as by different opposition groups fighting the regime. In one side 
the regime has called on Shi'ite civilian to fight against the Sunni population. On the 
other side and among the opposition groups, there are violent extremists as al-Nusrah 
(Nusrah Front), The Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and many other al-Qaida-
linked groups that engaged in many differentiated forms of human rights abuses. 
Islamists conducting massacres of Shi'ite community, destroying Shi'ite mosques, 
threatening Christians on their live if they do not join the oppositions fight against the 
regime and so on (Melia 2013).  
Due to its extension, the ongoing conflict can be characterized as a civil war in many 
ways, which has its roots in ethnic and religious controversies. The conflict involves 
many external and internal actors. It has increased the risk of ethnic as well as religious 
conflict for instance between Arab Sunni insurgents, Kurd forces, Alawites, Christian 
minorities or Druze in Syria. It has become a regional conflict threatening stability and 
increasing religious and ethnicity tensions in the region and other Muslim countries 
(ICG 2013a: 27ff.). According to Horowitz, ―conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to 
gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals‖ (Horowitz 
1985: 95). To obtain a broad understanding of how the level of Syrian conflict is raised 
to a civil war, we supply Horowitz definition of ethnic conflict by Small et. al. 
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definition of ethnic war ‖an ethnic war is defined as an episode of violent conflict 
between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities 
(ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status‖ (as 
Quoted by Reynal-Querol 2002: 37).  
 
Before analyzing the relations between divergent ethnic groups and ways they affect the 
escalation of the conflict, we attempt to show the ethnic construction of the Syrian 
society and the way people ethnically regarded themselves as other. The following 
quote by Habib Kahalah – a member of the Syrian parliament in 1947 – is a depiction of 
how the Syrian societal and political sphere was experienced after the independence of 
Syria, ‖I look around me and see only a bundle of contradictions (…). Men whom 
nothing united, sharing no principles (…); some were illiterate, others distinguished 
men of letters some spoke only Kurdish or Armenian, other only Turkish, some wore a 
tarbush, others a kafiyeh (…)‖ (Fildis 2012: 150). 
Syria consists of a combination of many differentiated ethnic and religious identities; 
Arab Sunni Muslim, Alawites, Druze, Kurds and Christians are respectively among the 
five distinguished ethnic and religious groups in the country. Since the establishment of 
the Syrian state in 1920, the country has often been plagued by ethnic controversies and 
in some periods also involved in arm conflict and extensive repression of ethnic groups 
conducted by the country‘s ruling regimes. The 1982 Hamaa uprising and the mass 
execution of the country‘s Sunni population, which 25.000 to 30.000 people were killed 
by the regime of Hafez al-Assad, is just an example among many for the strained 
relation between the Syrian regimes and ethnic groups (Robinson 2012). 
 
After the First World War, the victorious allies France and Britain divided the former 
Ottoman Empire to suit their particular interests (Fildis 2012: 148). The Syrian state was 
formed by colonial hands: ―separatism and the particularism of religious and national 
minorities (…) were encouraged by the granting of autonomous status to areas where 
such minorities formed a majority― (ibid). 
Altogether, differentiated Syrian ethnic and religious groups had never identified 
themselves within a unified national identity. The Syrian colonial period – the period of 
French mandate – is characterized by sectarian divisions in order to suppress and stifle 
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Arab nationalism and independence movements. Decades after the French left the 
country the society and the political life in Syria is still characterized by ―chaotic 
rivalries within the political elites itself, in single town and between leaders in rival 
towns, or between the urban-nationalist elite and the rural-based leadership of the 
compact minorities‖ (Fildis 2012: 149).  
 
As mentioned above, all the examples depict a society constructed by divided and 
contradictory identities, and it bears witness of a community by fragile fundament, 
which the coexistence between groups is more based on enforcement than voluntariness. 
Due to ethnic groups‘ differentiated and contradictory (self)-understandings of identity a 
close historical tie between these groups has never been present. 
 
Sunnis versus Alawites 
As Horowitz claims, there are different goals of ethnic conflicts, among them ―(…) 
control of a state and exemption from control by others are (…) the main goals of 
ethnic conflict‖ (Horowitz 1985: 5f.). In the case of Syria, a history marked by 
bloodsheds, rivalry and competitive relation with consequence for many human lives, 
particularly between the Sunni Muslims majority and the Alawites minority, for who 
should have the control over the political and socioeconomic power in Syria has become 
a kind of ‗frame of reference‘ for interaction between Syrians ethnic and religious 
groups.  
 
On July 18, 1963 a bloody power struggle took place between Sunni Baath officers and 
Alawites minority officers, and ended in a takeover by the minority officers. Alawites 
took control over the army and the political life in Syria, and the Sunnis became a 
subordinate group. Alawites later eliminated other heterodox Muslim groups: ―in 1966 
and 1968, the Alawi faction terminated the other two minoritarian-sectarian factions 
(the Druze and the Ismailis) and became the master of Syria‖ (Fildis 2012: 155). Since 
the takeover of political power by Hafez al-Assad in 1970, a big majority of Sunni, 
Druze and Kurd population appears to oppose the (al-Assad Alawites) regime in 
Damascus (Robinson 2012: 332). 
In scattered societies, ethnic conflict is at the center of politics. In many societies or 
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states including the new states of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Caribbean ethnic 
divisions and contradictory ethnic interests are the major roots for challenges to the 
cohesion of state internal affairs, interstate ethnic groups and sometimes threatening the 
peaceful relations among states and regions. Horowitz explains it by saying that ―ethnic 
conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and is often at the root of violence that 
results in looting, death, homelessness, and the flight of large numbers of people‖ 
(Horowitz 1985: 12). When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970, he one by one 
purged and excluded other ethnic groups, even groups of Sunni and Druze Baathist, 
from the political sphere allied with him during the takeover period. Thus, all the top 
power brokers in Syria were Alawites. Those radical changes in the structure of Syrian 
political resulted in appearances of ethnic and religious mistrust to the government and 
the whole political power in Syria Consequently, the dominant Alawites narrative today 
is ―kill or be killed‖ (Robinson 2012: 332).  
 
The following period of the social and political live in Syria is outshined by distrust 
among the Sunni, Kurds and the Alawites of the Baath party, which many, particularly 
Sunnis regarded the Alawite Baathist regime to be illegitimate, oppressive and anti-
Islamic (Fildis 2012: 155). The last round of the Syrian civil war began after the Syrian 
invasion and intervention of Lebanon to support the Christian minority during the 
Lebanese civil war. In 1976, the regime of Hafez al-Assad was the unquestioned ruler of 
Syria. In this war, 25.000 to 30.000 people were killed. The conflict was instigated by 
Sunni Muslim groups including the Muslim Brotherhood and lasted for six year. The 
conflict between the two Muslim groups, Alawites and Sunni, resulted in rapid growth 
of Islamist politics throughout the Middle East in the 1970s. Due to the duration of the 
civil war in 1970s and the many economic and political consequences of the war 
brought the Assad regime to the brink of collapse. Assad ensured the survival of his 
regime by making a political agreement with his bitter rivals the Sunni bourgeoisie, the 
notable class that had dominated the economic and political life in Syria for centuries. 
An alliance between Assad, the Sunni bourgeoisie and Christian gave the regime the 
necessity power to overcome and defeat the Hama movement of Muslim Brotherhood, 
drove them into the underground, thereby winning the first round of Syrian civil war 
(Robinson 2012: 331). When the Arab nationalist Baath party took power in a military 
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coup in 1963, rejected parts of the Syrian national identity defined by the French/ 
European colonial power. Instead, they structured a new and unified Arab Syrian 
identity, where regarded Syria as a ‗regional command‘. ―This failure to construct a 
strong Syria national identity has left in place a broad Arab Nationalism among a dying 
cadre of true believer and a very strong parochial identities along ethnic and religious 
lines‖, and as Robinson assumes Syrians still has a weak sense of shared national 
identity (ibid: 332). Robinson further argues that Syria's history is a history of an 
ongoing civil war. The second round of this war began in March 2011 in Dara‘a (ibid). 
To find explanation for the escalation several issues needs to be underlined. The 
involvement and influence of hard-line and extremist Islamic and Jihadist groups within 
the Syrian opposition and the fear of minority groups including Christians and Kurds for 
their future, after the fall of Assad, is one of the issues that exacerbate the conflict and 
finding a solution for it (ibid: 333). 
 
Minority Domination 
Horowitz, in attempting to explain the way differentiated ethnic groups and ethnicities 
do contribute to conflict employs the concept of Genealogical doubts, which means that 
group member try to suppress groups that see each other as permanently distinctive, of a 
sense of peoplehood and of the corporate aspect of sectarian affiliations. He assumes 
that the concept of ethnicity means that ‗ethnic conflict is one phenomenon and not 
several‘, by this Horowitz means that the extend and course of ethnic conflict are, 
among others, depending on some factors as; the degree (ranked or unranked) of 
relation between group of ethnicities and how groups are distributed in relation to 
territory and state institutions (Horowitz 1985: 51ff). According to John S. Furnivall, a 
plural society is characterized by cultural divergence (as quoted Horowitz 1985: 135). 
There are some degrees of economic relations between different ethnic divisions, but 
the society experiences lack of shared values and common will. These kinds of societies 
are held together by dint of the force of either the ruling classes or the colonial power. 
Horowitz classified the form of structures of such societies as insecure and unstable 
(Horowitz 1985:135f.). 
In Syria, the relation between the people still is dominated by groups compete and 
exclude each other from the political scene. These kinds of relation result in an 
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atmosphere of mistrust. Furthermore, it causes a divergent and controversy 
understanding of the meaning of being a Syrian. The Syrian social and political system 
is characterized by ethnic minority domination. Also, a society where the majority, in 
this case Sunni Muslims, are dominated and managed by a minority group of Alawites 
(Kaufmann and Haklai 2008: 744). 
The emergence of this sort of political structure can be explained as a legacy of 
colonial regimes. In the case of Syria, the French colonial power for avoiding 
occurrence of a unified Arab nationalism, practiced ―a divide-and-rule policies that 
favored one indigenous minority, handed it a superior social status, and co-opted it into 
the governing apparatus and the security forces‖ (ibid: 748). This policy allowed the 
favored minority groups to either maintain political power or take over the state and 
political power later. The French divide-and- rule policy allowed Alawites to have 
access and influence in the Syrian army, police and security service.
4
 Later, this 
influence paved the way for Hafez al-Assad and Alawites to take over the state political 
power in the post-independent Syria (ibid: 750). 
 
The regime of al-Assad (the father as well as the son) like other minority dominated-
regimes has attempted to maintain the political hegemony by exercising power and 
relying on repressing opponents and excluding majorities from decision-making centers 
(ibid). The massacre of Muslim Brothers in the city of Hama in 1982, and the ongoing 
Syrian conflict are both among outcomes of the power and political structures of the 
Syrian society. The reasons for both the ongoing conflict in Syria and the previous one 
from 1982 have the same historical roots: ―a minority based regime, allied with other 
minorities along with privileged elements from the majority population, ruling over a 
poor and often dysfunctional state that doesn‟t tolerate dissenters‖ (Robinson 2012: 
331). 
Controlling all positions in the military, security agencies, decision making agencies 
by members of the minority Alawites group consists of an alliance between tribes and 
sub-groups – Kalbiyya, Matawira and Haddadin – during a long period has ensured the 
existence of the regime (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008:752).  
 
                                                 
4
 The Alawites were seen by the French as reliable allies, who could be counted upon to suppress 
nationalist revolts. 
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Differences on Values 
A plural society is defined as a society that ‖only when one of the cultural sections 
dominates the others. If each section were to carry on its cultural practices freely, each 
would constitute a separate society. In addition the absence of consensus requires, (…) 
regulation by force‖ (Horowitz 1985: 136). In most cases, plural societies resulting in 
the emergence of ethnic hierarchies or ranked system, and as Smith assumes; where 
ethnic pluralism is, there will be a strong tendency toward domination by one of the 
group (ibid). Furthermore, plural societies are ―defined by dissensus and pregnant with 
conflict‖ (ibid: 136f.).  
 
In the Syrian society the fundamental disagreement around national identity and a lack 
of common will and values are the heart of insecurity and instability that could 
threatening a plural society. These controversies and disagreements in sectional and 
institutional values cause emerging ethnic conflicts. Because of al-Assad treatment to 
others ethnic groups, most Alawites fear that in case of a collapse of the regime, and a 
takeover of power – by oppositions (dominated by Sunni Muslims) –  a ethnic cleansing 
against them will take place (Robinson 2012: 332). 
 
The army 
The role of the military and army can affect the ethnic distribution of power, and in case 
of the Syrian conflict, it determines the extension as well as the direction of the conflict. 
As Horowitz puts it; ‖military intervention does not leave ethnic conflict where it finds 
it‖ (Horowitz 1985: 526). In general and especially in ethnic conflict, the military plays 
a determinant role, when it can attempt to bring excluded ethnic groups to power or 
make them obstacles for gaining power. Furthermore, it is possible to take power away 
from groups, which had enjoyed it before (ibid: 444). The Syrian regime created a 
comprehensive security mechanism, including a brutal security service and an army to 
protect its position. During the uprising – to quell the movement – ―the regime 
primarily has relied on its security services, military apparatus and allied militias to 
subdue the uprising, it also has sought to project a degree of openness to 'reform' and 
'dialogue', albeit on its own terms‖ (ICG 2013b: 6). 
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The role of the military can be considered both as a resource and an object of ethnic 
conflict. That means using the military as an instrument can both contribute to phase out 
a conflict, avoid a massacre or become an important element for ethnic resentment and 
an instrument for capture and obtain of ethnic claims to power. The outcome will 
depend on the purpose for using military forces – peace-making or power taking. The 
role of military can be a crucial determinate during ethnic conflict. Utilizing military 
force in some cases can often help control ethnic upheaval; as long as the army does not 
favor one group or another, whatever if it does, the interventions will aggravate the 
violence. Ethnic divided army – in the case of ongoing domestic conflict or secessionist 
uprising – may exacerbate warfare situation. While civil war occurs the army will split 
into two or more parties. Experiences from other ethnic conflicts, like in Burma, Nigeria 
and Lebanon, showed that the military is a determinant participant in such conflicts and 
will affect its outcome (Horowitz 1985: 443ff.). 
 
Roots of the Conflict 
The conflict escalated for the first time when the regime involved the military and secret 
service to control and quell the revolt. The regime applied a poor crisis-management 
which resulted in civil war rhetoric in the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. Here, 
the first phase of the escalation of the conflict can be seen. Therefore, both sides of the 
conflict – the regime as well as opposition groups – use armed forces, this seen as the 
beginning of the militarization of the conflict. The role of the divided army in 
controlling the protests may be one of the reasons for the escalation of the conflict.      
In the early phase of the movement, both the opposition umbrella group – National 
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces – (Ohlheiser 2012), and the regime 
with its allies had two ‗black-and-white‘ and contradictory narratives of the crises. On 
one side the opposition group ―presented the image of an entirely peaceful movement 
enduring savage repression‖ (ICG 2011c: 1), and on the other side the regime described 
the crisis just as a local manifestation of a vicious regional and international struggle, 
afterward the regime denied the people‘s claim for reform. They both had overlooked 
the need for a successful management of the internationalized crises. At the first stage 
of the crises, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on one hand draws more military defectors to 
its side and increased attacks against the security services. And at the other hand, the 
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regime kept denying the existence of a deep-seated popular protest. Instead, the regime 
attempted to reduce the crises to an action of foreign-backed armed gangs (ibid). 
Therefore the regime took the Alawites as hostage and linked their fate to its own (ibid: 
2). The Alawites role – among them the Shabbiha group – for putting down protests, 
disseminating propaganda and staging pro-regime demonstrations transformed anti-
Alawites feelings into a perilous reality. The regime‘s behavior conformed to the worse 
anti-Alawites stereotypes. During the conflict and by growth of the regimes repression, 
many Syrians shifted the way of criticizing it; also ―from blaming elements of regime to 
blaming the regime as a whole and, finally, to blaming the Alawites community itself‖ 
(ibid). Yassin al-Haj Saleh, a prominent dissident, explained,  
 
―the Assad regime depended on „divide and rule‟ strategy; it nurtured divisions by 
turning the different ethnic, religious and sectarian groups against each other. It 
did that also by creating yes-man political parties and other half-loyal opposition 
parties. It also did so by attracting dissidents with carrots and sticks and 
sometimes by terrorizing them.‖ (ICG 2013b: 7f.) 
 
Historical heritage is one of the explanations for roots of conflict between ethnic groups. 
In case of occurrence of domestic conflict fragmented nation-states are more likely to 
experience high degree of escalation of the conflict (Ellingsen 2000: 222). Majority‘s 
critic of the regime and the way they opposed the regime has resulted in panic in the 
Alawite community. They are concerned that in the post-Assad Syria have to fear, 
revenge and ethnic cleansing. Large parts of the Christian community too, seem to have 
the same feeling and fear (ICG 2011: 2c).  
 
Divided Opposition 
Ethnic- religious heterogeneity and a divergent of interests is a challenging issue for the 
opposition groups in their fight against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The civil war has 
increased the risk of ethnic as well as religious conflict – for instance between Arab 
Sunni insurgents, Kurd forces, Alawites, Christian minorities and Druze (Reese 2013). 
It has become a regional conflict, threatening stability and contributes to increasing 
religious and ethnic tensions in the region and in other Muslim countries. 
Simultaneously, the conflict has attracted and involved many internal and external 
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actors – among them different jihadists from all over the region. Hence, conflict is 
becoming a multi-layered conflict. On one level, it is a conflict which ordinary Syrian 
revolt against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, on the other level, it causes clashes 
between; Sunnis and Alawits, Islamists and non-Islamists, Islamists against the regime 
and so on. As an American official characterized Syria experiences a three-front war 
which the FSA rebels ―face the Assad regime, forces from its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, 
and now the multinational jihadist ranks of ISIS‖ (Malas 2013).  
These ethnic and religious groups are split between; the Turkey based Syrian 
National Council, the Damascus National based National Council of Coordination and 
the FSA. These three groups are disagreeing on the use of violence and the scope of 
negotiation with Assad. In addition, they lack coherence in both political and military 
mobilization, and fail to mobilize and manage a wide base of troops in fighting against 
the al-Assad regime (Bhardwaj 2013: 9ff.). 
 
Islamist‘s Agenda  
Political Scientist Samuel Huntington phrases the role of religion as a primarily and 
central force for motivating people. In Huntington‘s notion, the religious and ethnic 
background can force people to commit violence. He assumes that ―faith and family, 
blood and beliefs are the aspects with which people identify themselves, the 
characteristics for which they fight and die. Belonging to different religions have 
different versions of many relations among individuals and authorities‖ (Reynal-Querol 
2002: 31). Following, religion has a greater effect in shaping relationship between 
people than ethnicity, and it discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and 
exclusive way even more than belonging to a country. He underpins his claim as: a 
person can be half French and half Saudi Arabian and, at the same time, be a citizen of 
both countries. However, it is difficult to be half Catholic and half Muslim (ibid). 
Islamist Jihadist insurgents from both inside and outside of Syria, and their extremist 
religious motivation to fight the al-Assad regime is one among other factors that 
contribute to the escalation of the conflict: ―the agendas of these militant groups often 
go against the local residents‟ sense of nationalism and anger these communities with 
their extreme interpretations of Islam‖ (Byman 2013: 353). 
Salafi-Jihadisd insurgency groups – are among most known and dominating groups – 
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which fight against both the al-Assad regime and the FSA. The purposes of their 
struggle is to establish an Islamic state – based on Sharia law, overturning supposedly 
apostate governments, driving the U.S., other western countries, and local non-Salafist 
regimes out of their country or region, as Byman puts it: ―they universally stress a 
rejection of any deviation from what they perceive as the oneness of God and display 
hostility to non- Muslims‖ (ibid). These groups are opposing nationalism and rejecting 
the boundaries of dividing Muslim countries into different states.  
The Salafi-jihadist rhetoric often dwells on more popular elements of their ideology, 
―particularly resistance to non-Muslim foreigners or to disliked rival Muslim 
communities‖ (ibid). These fundamentalist Islamic groups in Syria emphases the need of 
fight: non-Muslims and non-Salafi communities – among them Christians and Kurds – 
in their propaganda stress toppling the regime and attacking Alawites (ibid). The way 
Islamist Jihadist groups – as external actors – affect the extend as well as the duration of 
the conflict will be highlighted and analyzed in the third section – concerning the role of 
the external actors.  
 
In general, domestic conflicts with roots in religious dissensus result in higher 
combatant deaths rates, last longer and they are more likely to recur once ended: ―Civil 
wars in which religion was central were four times deadlier to noncombatants than civil 
wars in which religion was peripheral‖ (Toft 2007: 117). To explain the relation 
between religion and civil war, Toft refers to the concept of Religious Outbidding (ibid: 
103). During a process of religious outbidding, elites or leaders of different religious 
groups attempt to outbid each other regarding to enhance their religious credentials, and 
thereby gain the support they need to counter an immediate threat (ibid).   
Among temporal civil wars with roots in religious differences, Toft phrases the role 
of Islamic jihadist-groups and their contribution to escalate conflict into a religious civil 
war. She underpin her claim by using following example; ―in 42 religious civil wars 
from 1940 to 2000, incumbent governments and rebels who identified with Islam were 
involved in 34 (81 percent), far more than those identifying with other religions, such as 
Christianity (21, or 50 percent) or Hinduism (7, or 16 percent)‖ (Toft 2007: 97).        
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3.1.1 Summary  
The historical background of Syria – as a colonial-state both regarding establishment the 
state of Syria and constructing a Syrian national identity – is less than one hundred 
years old. The country consists of many ethnic and religious groups by which they are 
in many ways differentiate from each other. These groups have different degrees of 
national self-understanding. Sociopolitical instability, ethnic-religious disagreement and 
difference in interests had been a striking part of the Syrian political history. Syrians 
different ethnic and religious groups had always been held together by dint of the force, 
either by the ruling classes or the colonial power. For decades the country has been an 
arena of bloody power struggles between ethnic groups – especially between Sunni-
Muslims and Alawites. Takeover power by Hafez al-Assad – an Alawites officer – in 
1970s caused a fundamental and prolonged change of the Syrian socio-economic and 
political structure. Since, the political system of Syria is characterized as a minority 
dominated society. Hafez al-Assad‘s ruling-period is outshined by repression, exclusion 
and execution of political opponents. Emergence of the current political conflict in Syria 
will be understood as an extension of previous conflicts, with roots in same historical 
background and result of conflicting relations between different ethnic and religious 
interests and agendas. The role of fundamentalist jihadist groups with a excluding and 
intolerance political agenda is among one another explanations for escalation of the 
Syrian conflict.             
 
3.2 The People-Government Relation  
In the following section, we will analyze the second identified factor for the escalation 
of the Syrian conflict. Our assumption is that because of the pathologic relation between 
the state institutions and the Syrian people, and vice versa, no appeasement in the early 
stages of the conflict was possible. Instead, the relationship was characterized by mutual 
mistrust. This mistrust and the resulting inability to communicate over political 
demands and ideas, combined with the previous analyzed ethnic fault-liens prevent a 
less violent development of the protests. 
In our analysis, we frame the state-people relation in terms of a trust-mistrust-
relation. By doing so, we are able to capture the interplay in both directions – both in 
the relation between the people and the state-institutions and vice versa. We claim that 
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the mutual missing of a trustful basis between wide parts of the society and government, 
police and judiciary leaded towards an escalation of the protest into an armed conflict – 
and finally to the civil war we are facing today. 
Social trust is seen as essential for a civilized (sic!) social life and political trust as 
essential for the functioning of democratic institutions (Newton 2001: 205). Obviously, 
there are major differences between liberal democracies and autocracies. For 
democracies the need for a healthy trust-relation is far more important than for 
autocracies. If citizens of a democratic state lack trust, the whole basis of a functioning 
living-together crumbles. In an autocracy, on the contrary, mistrust is more or less the 
norm. This is one reason for many autocracies to have extensive security forces. They 
do not need trust, they need troops. In a liberal democracy in contrast, trust can be seen 
as a device for coping with the freedom of other persons (Luhmann 1979).  
In this section of the analysis we want to analyze why trust is an essential ingredient for 
the functioning of any state and what consequences results of a lack of it. 
 
Conceptualizing Trust-Relations   
It is not difficult to identify Syria as an autocratic state. Autocracies always have a trust 
problem which is one of their constitutive characters. In a report for the Center for 
Systemic Peace, Marshall and Cole characterize an autocracy as a state with sharply 
restricted citizen participation and suppression. Furthermore, chief executives are 
selected according to clearly defined rules of succession from within the established 
political elite. Once in office, ―chief executives exercises power with no meaningful 
checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions‖ (Marshall and Cole 2011: 
9). In consequence it means, a small clique of politicians can rule the country without 
bearing the responsibility for their actions and almost without any restrictions. The 
above listed characteristics can be applied to Syria. But one dimension is missing in this 
definition of autocracy. Following Ted Gurrs conceptualizations, Syria is also a police 
state: ―[A police state] maintains a large internal security establishment and is ruled by 
an elite that relies primarily on coercion to control domestic opponents and implement 
state policies‖ (Gurr 1988: 51). A police (and its final stage, the military) state can be 
seen as the embodiment of a pathological trust-relation between the state and its 
citizens.  
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Syria is not only an autocratic state, but one with a dynastic succession. The Assad-clan 
now rules Syria for more than forty years. They managed to install family members and 
other loyal figures in all important positions in the state administration, the military and 
other institutions. Assad‘s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, for example, is a mighty and 
wealthy businessman. He symbolizes the monopolization of national resources by a 
small elite that does not even redistribute wealth to its own community (Robinson 2012: 
334). Without his approval, no foreign company can do business in Syria. As 
mentioned, not only the Syrian economic sphere is in the hands of the Assad clan, the 
military is too. Two of Hafez al-Assad's brothers, Assef Shawkat and Maher al-Assad, 
are hold high positions in the Syrian Army (EU Council 2011). The former was chief of 
staff of the Syrian Army until his death in 2012; the latter is commander of the 
Republican Guard. These are only a few examples and more could be easily find. The 
Assad clan firmly held Syria in their hands. To ensure the long-time status quo, the 
country never held free, multi-party elections. The opposition is strictly suppressed and 
free media does not exist. Thus, it is difficult for the regime to get in touch with its 
people and to get to know their needs and demands. Instead, the officials have been 
busily filling their own wallets through massive corruption.  
 
In the following section, we will keep the above mentioned information in mind, 
elaborate the concept of institutional trust in regards to Syria and discuss our 
assumption that the pathologic trust relation is one factor of the escalated protest. In 
order to do so, we must answer the question why the people‘s mistrust in the political 
institutions or rather the government‘s mistrust in its people catalyzed the conflict. 
Different theoretical approaches deal with the relationship between governments and its 
people. The problem is that on the one hand, game-theoretical approaches tend to give 
rather clear answers to questions, but fail to see the complex reality of a case. For 
example  Jan Henryk Pierskalla found out ―that governments that are strong enough to 
successfully repress protest will be able to deter the opposition from taking the streets, 
while weak governments will have to compromise with the opposition‖ (2010: 11). As 
one can see, it is not possible to explain the complex and multi-layered situation in Syria 
by applying these findings. Assad's regime is neither weak enough to be toppled nor 
strong enough to fight the oppositional forces back. In Syria things are not as clear cut 
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as Pierskalla‘s model suggests. Especially in the second phase, the gestation of the 
conflict, power relations were not clear anymore. Furthermore, Pierskalla‘s model does 
not provide further answers to a conflicts context. 
On the other hand, post-colonial approaches tend to overemphasize the historical 
dimension which in this project will not be employed, even though some of the findings 
and insights of this approach seem to explain why the Syrian state could not establish 
strong and trustworthy institutions.
5
 
As we already have shown in the previous section, the history of Syria is marked by 
separatism and particularism. First the colonial rulers, later the Syrian government 
always tried – and most often succeeds – to treat parts of the society preferentially. 
Therefore, Syria was always ruled by the maxim of ‗rule and divine‘. This way of 
leading the country did of course not only infect the political life. Even in business-
relations, an area where one could expect that money is more important than ethnic 
differences, the division has a deep impact. As Bassam Haddad observes, Alawi-
dominated leadership did and do not trust Sunni businessmen, because they, as a 
collective, can be a potential thread to the regime or its interest (Haddad 2012: ch. 2). 
Certainly cooperation exists, but only via punctual relationships. Therefore, cooperation 
– thus trust – on a broader, or societal-level is not possible (ibid). Trust problems do not 
only exists between different ethnic groups, but appears to be a general problem in the 
Syrian society. Another study conducted by Laura Mitchell is a further indicator for the 
weak social-trust among the Syrians: the results of the study show that 41 percent of the 
Syrian university youth ‗does not trust any (social) group‘ (Mitchell 2010:15). Both 
observations are examples for the deep-rooted mistrust in Syrian society. As we will 
argue further, neither trust in other than the own ethnicity nor into state institution is 
unlikely to find in Syria. 
 
Trust, Mistrust and the State  
In order to understand the relationship between trust, mistrust and how the Syrian state 
functioned before the conflict arose, some insights about social and political trust in 
general must be discussed. For a functioning living-together in a large-scale and 
impersonal society, trust in institutions is as important as trust in family, friends or 
                                                 
5 Syria has a clear colonial legacy. The elites never fully emancipated from the colonial-based 
institutions (Hinnebusch 2012: 96). 
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colleagues (Luhmann 1988). Or as put by Dunn: ―Trust as a human passion may rest on 
close familiarity or massive social distance. Many have trusted their Queen (or Stalin) 
as implicitly as ever they have trusted their spouse or favorite sibling‖ (2000: 74). 
Therefore, it is possible for humans to have trust in abstract constructions like states and 
governments. The question one needs to ask now is how such kind of trust can be 
established? The long established literature on trust indicates that a complex 
relationship between inter-personal and political trust exists (Newton and Norris 1999; 
Newton 2001). One major difference between inter-personal and political trust is how to 
gain it: ―Social or inter-personal trust can be based upon immediate, first-hand 
experience of others, whereas political trust is most generally learned indirectly and at 
a distance, usually through the media‖ (Newton 2001: 205). Without media a public 
sphere cannot emerge or exist in a large-scale society. Therefore, the mass media is the 
medium through which the public sphere is linked to the individuals (Calhoun 2001). 
Newton continues to describe how this relationship between social capital
6
 and civil 
society does not exist at an individual, but at the aggregate level:  
 
“A relationship exists, as social capital and civil society theory predicts, but not 
at the individual level, and only in a complicated and indirect manner at the 
system level. Since social capital and civil society are essentially a social and 
collective property of social systems, not a characteristic feature that individuals 
carry around with them, the relationship is found at the aggregate level of society 
as a whole.“ (Newton 2001: 205) 
 
As we see, systemic factors like social capital and a civil society play a major role in 
establishing trust. In Syria, it is worthwhile to have a look into the Syrian political 
system, to get an insight into the pathologic trust-relation. As mentioned above, the 
Baath party rules Syria for over forty years now – of course, no other parties are 
allowed next to it. Here, another factor for the missing trust in state-institutions can be 
seen: following Dunn, political parties are an important carrier for political trust (Dunn 
                                                 
6 Newton does not further explain the concept of capital. Additional to social capital, several principle 
forms of capital exists: economic, symbolic and cultural capital. For Bourdieu, "social capital is the 
sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). 
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2000: 89). In a multi-party system most people can identify themself with and trust in at 
least one party. In a single-party system only a small range of ideas and forms of living 
are represented. Without free elections and real political choices, citizens cannot 
develop hope, that 'their' political view will be part of the government – not even in an 
undefined future (ibid). Right after Hafez al-Asad's death a civil movement arose which 
demanded an end of the over forty years lasting emergency law, a multi-party system 
and competitive elections – but it soon was repressed (Hinnebusch 2012: 103). 
Observers raise the question, why Bashar did not open the political system – at least to a 
small degree. Thereby, he could have silenced the critics and with the popular base – he 
had to this time – chances for losing potential elections were limited (ibid). Without an 
open political discourse and free media, no vital public sphere could develop. In this 
case, the public sphere can be seen as a resonance body for citizen's demands and needs; 
something which was not present in Syria before the conflict started. The missing of a 
public sphere results in the impossibility for the government to know what is going on 
and for citizens to speak up and discuss political issues. The lack of an open discourse – 
and the negative everyday experiences most Syrians constantly faced – made it difficult 
to establish social-trust and social capital, on the aggregate level. As mentioned by 
Newton, without social-trust it is difficult to build up political trust. Syria – as a nation – 
failed to establish a ‗healthy‘ civil society (Newton 2001: 210).  
 
Albeit some attempts to do so existed, especially, after Bashar came to power in 2000 
(Hinnebusch 2012: 95; ICG 2011a: 2). He presented himself as reformer and, in the 
beginning of his reign, it looked like as if he and his government want to change and 
open Syria – at least a little bit: ―the regime unquestionably continued to severely curtail 
civil rights and liberties, and retribution for any form of visible dissent still was the 
norm. But it became far easier for ordinary citizens to get on with their lives and, 
compared to the reign of fear they imposed in the 1980s, security services were less 
intrusive and more restrained‖ (ICG 2011a: 2).  
However, up to the breakout of the conflict, all attempts to establish a civil society 
(either button up or top-down) failed. Political institutions did not provide stability or 
assistance for the people to manage their lives.  
In addition to the weak civil society, the social consistency of the Syrian society is 
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another reason for the lacking of mutual trust. In Syria, social-trust mainly follows the 
lines of ethnic cleavages. Certainly, trust punctually exists across these lines. But it 
seems that the deep cleavage between the multitudes of ethnicities in Syria is an 
important factor when it comes to the establishment of trust on the individual level. As 
we mentioned before, lacking – or only punctual – individual trust is a weak basis for 
establishing lasting trust in abstract institutions.  
Even though the society is divided by ethnic cleavages, a distinct feeling of being 
Syrian and a Syrian pride developed during the last decades. It derived from the depth 
of local culture, the music of Syrian Arabic, the elegance of Syrian manners, the finesse 
of Syrian cuisine and the sincerity of Syrian hospitality (Harling and Birke 2013). 
Furthermore, many Syrians have the feeling of belonging to a kind of Arab vanguard 
(ICG 2011a: 9). However, all these different kinds of pride are not captured by the state 
and its institutions. Paradoxically, the regime, first under Hafez, then under Bashar al-
Assad, tried to unify the country by playing off the different ethnicities against each 
other: ―Far from fostering the emergence of a genuine national sentiment and feeling of 
citizenship, it has done its best to promote and solidify communal divides, thereby 
hoping to be seen as the sole bulwark against a perilous confessional fragmentation‖ 
(ibid:2).  
 
Establish Trust 
One has to acknowledge the difference between trust given to already established and 
developed institutions, and to establish trust towards something new and unknown. 
Where successfully operating political institutions already exist, most people are 
indifferent towards there emergence and existence (Dunn 2000: 80). Problems with 
trust-relations only emerge in the moment, the institution either stop functioning well or 
a new institution is to be about to develop. If this is the case, particularly strong trust is 
needed (ibid). Why should a person invest trust in an institution, when one cannot 
predict if the new congress, federal governments, executive, parliament, parties, police, 
or civil service will survive over time and serve the people. The experience many 
Syrians made in the last decades was, often enough, that trusting in the state-institutions 
is frustrating and sometimes even dangerous. Here, the paradox of trust establishment 
becomes clear: without individual trust it is not possible to establish trust on the 
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aggregate level and without social-trust and a functioning civil society, individual trust 
is difficult to establish. Like Newton and Norris note, ―if social trust declines, 
government institutions performance will suffer and citizens confidence in government 
fall‖ (Newton and Norris 1999: 8). If the relation is disturbed, it is very difficult to break 
up the downward spiral. And it is even more difficult to establish such a relation in the 
first place. 
 
Assad Gambles Away the Last Rest of Trust 
The second and third phases of the conflict had already broken out and the mobilization 
began, and it shows a growing lack of confidence in politics and its ability to bring 
change. Even though, between March and late May 2011, Assad promised far-reaching 
reforms and changes, the masses continued and even expanded their protest (ICG 
2011b: 17). To draw a complete picture, one also has to keep in mind that a mentionable 
number of citizens did activate enough trust to stay on Assad‘s side. They believed that 
the announced reforms would steer Syria out of the crisis, or at least not deepen it. In 
fact, this moment can be seen as the moment of the polarization of the Syrian people 
(Harling and Birke 2013). This indicates that an unequal distribution of trust towards the 
government and political institutions did exist within the Syrian society. During the 
same period of time, the reactions of the government indicate, that it does not trust any 
social groups. Incidents are reported that the government, for instance, equipped 
Alawits with weapons and sandbags to protect and barricade their villages (ICG 2011c: 
2; Harling and Birke 2013). Apparently, the regime was afraid that without stoking fear 
in the community, the average Alawites would turn their backs on them too. In the 
outset of the protests the regime also started to establish a personal cult around Bashar 
al-Assad. Huge pictures of him were installed in the big cities and officials called 
Bashar the ‗Father leader‘. An expression which was last used for Hafez al-Assad (ICG 
2011a: 7).   
Furthermore, instead of moving towards the protesters and listen to their demands – 
which were quite moderate in the beginning – Assad and his circle preferred to beat 
them down: ―instead of playing his cards right, the regime has turned a deep sense of 
malaise into a full-blown protest movement and transformed a manageable crisis into 
one that is increasingly dangerous both to itself and to its people‖ (ibid: 5). The regime 
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added fuel to the fire by doing almost everything wrong.  
Even though, the regime claimed to represent and defend the state, it exactly failed in 
doing so. ―Instead, it has manipulated social fault lines and used divisive tactics to 
frighten Syrians into accepting its rule as a lesser evil‖ (ICG 2011c: 6). As mentioned 
before, the regime takes the Alawit's hostage and plays them and other minorities out 
against the Sunni Arab majority. Furthermore, it ―unleashed its security forces against 
unarmed protesters and covered up for their sectarian behavior; and hired criminals to 
do its dirty work, while turning a blind eye to the criminalization of its own regular 
forces – elements of which have resorted to theft, kidnapping and weapons smuggling‖ 
(ibid). It looks like that the government lost control over parts of the state institutions. 
To motivate officials to stay loyal, the regime turned its back against corruption and 
opened the floodgates to further destructive behavior (Hinnebusch 2012: 97): ―All in all, 
the regime has encouraged ‒ if not rewarded ‒ the most destructive forms of social 
behavior‖ (ICG 2011c: 6). 
 
So far, we could show that Syria is an autocracy and a police state. This is important in 
order to see, that a pathologic trust-relation is inherent to the Syrian case. A short 
historical excursus supported this impression as well. The introduced social and political 
trust approach shows us, that gaining trust is always a difficult endeavor. Individual 
trust affects trust on the aggregate level. Without the first, the latter is not possible and 
vice versa. Because of the mutual mistrust, the Syrian government was unable to cope 
with the emerging protest movement.  
 
Interplay of Inter-Personal and Institutional Trust  
It seems reasonable that if someone can trust his or her neighbors or colleagues, the 
person will also develop the ability to trust more abstract formations. Thus, one is able 
to feel trust in political institutions, if conditions for individual social trust are given. 
Newton explains the relationship between both as follows: 
 
‖Individual social trust helps to build the cooperative social relations on which 
effective social and political organizations are built-a bottom-up process. 
Effective social and political organizations help to create effective and legitimate 
government, which then help to create the social conditions for high levels of 
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social capital and a well-developed civil society - a top-down process. Similarly, 
individual political trust helps to build effective political institutions that enable 
governments to perform well, and to build up political capital as well as creating 
the conditions for a flourishing civil society- another bottom-up and top- down 
process. Hence, social capital and a developed civil society help to make good 
government possible, and good government helps to sustain social capital and 
the conditions of civil society.‖ (Newton 2001: 211) 
 
It is obvious, that the relationship is complementary. Without individual social-trust it is 
impossible to build cooperative social relations, hence to build an effective and 
legitimate government. In the same time, without a flourishing civil society and a 
‗good‘ government, it is difficult to build a sustainable trust relation with the people. In 
Syria, the lack of social-trust and political capital on the one hand, and effective and 
legitimate government on the other, are closely related. 
One result of the dysfunctional civil society is that neither the regime nor the 
opposition (or better oppositional groups) have ever learned to communicate, let alone 
negotiate, with each other. Hence, they are lacking political capital. The only language 
known to them is and was the one of power politics. Deliberation remains an unknown 
concept. One exemplary case therefore, is the secular opposition. Due to his ‗rule and 
divine‘ policy, Hafez al-Assad backed up Islamist groups in Syria in order to 
marginalize various secular groups. Thus, the secular groups had no chance to build up 
any infrastructure or organization within the country (ICG 2013b: 7). In addition, many 
dissidents went into exile or hided in Syria. The International Crisis Group subsumes 
the situation as followed: ―the roots of the political opposition‟s difficulties lie, first and 
foremost, in the oppressive domestic environment from which it emerged. The result has 
been a hodgepodge of exiles, intellectuals and secular dissidents bereft of a genuine 
political constituency, as well as Muslim Brothers geographically detached from their 
natural base‖ (ibid: i). Consequential, the conditions to build a civil society in Syria 
were poor. As Newton argues, without social-trust and therefore, a missing civil society, 
state-institutions does not function (Newton1999: 8). 
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Institutional Failure 
Following Theda Skocpol, the state is no anymore as an arena in which socio-economic 
struggles are fought out (Skocpol 1979: 29). In her notion, it consists out of ―a set of 
administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well 
coordinated by, an executive authority‖ (ibid). This idea of the state, which contests the 
idea of the state as a well-functioning hierarchy, led by a contingent government, meets 
the reality in Syria. Weak or fragile state institutions do not have the will and capacities 
to meet and execute requests from citizens. In the same time, they have the same 
difficulties with executing orders from the legislative or to control the executive (Böhret 
1983: 19f.). Reasons for the poor performance can either be found in the bad training of 
the employees, the shortage of resources or dysfunctional hierarchies because of 
corruption or particularistic interests (ibid). The above mentioned characteristics of an 
autocracy come to play here again. Paired with the economy being in the hands of 
members of Assad‘s close circle, it seems to be doubtful that authorities are able to 
provide for what the people need. The ICG observed that, at its core, ―the protest 
movement is a revolt against poor governance in provinces that the regime has long left 
adrift‖ (ICG 2011a: 13). People all over the country share the same deep fatigue and 
frustration. Especially in the rural provinces, the security services were often 
overstrained (ICG 2011b: 5). The government money disappeared in official‘s pockets 
and governmental initiatives failed because of incompetent employees: ―among 
governors, blatant corruption and incompetence were the norm. As a Syrian official 
said, 'governors are corrupt almost as a professional requirement. It is part and parcel 
of the system. The leadership assumes that loyalty requires involvement in a system of 
graft'‖ (ICG 2011a: 14). As Hinnebusch notices, this leads to a change of people‘s 
behavior: ―where citizens would once have gone to local party or union officials for 
redress or access, increasingly they approached tribal, sectarian or religious notables‖ 
(Hinnebusch 2012: 99). 
 
When the first protests broke out, the regime was unable to accept who its opponents 
really were. For several months, it claimed that foreign insurgencies, sponsored by the 
Western or Islamists, attack the society from the outside (ICG 2011a: 4; ICG 2011c: 1). 
Later it claimed ―that only a handful of decisive military operations against residual 
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terrorist‟s pockets stood between the crisis and its resolution‖ (ICG 2011c: 2). The 
regime totally failed in recognizing the problems that the people in the streets claimed to 
have. The only answers it had was brutal suppression of unarmed protesters (in the very 
beginning) and half-hearted promises.  
As one can see, the relationship between the government-institutions and the people 
is characterized by mutual mistrust. Syria is a full-scale police state. Political 
representation does not exist. This does not only result in an underdeveloped public 
sphere and a non-existing political culture, but also in a political clique which lost touch 
with the people. This fragile structure may survive or continue as long as no significant 
social unrest erupts. Apparently, in the moment when the protest movement rose, the 
structures fell apart. The state is neither able to meet the demands or listen to them. By 
claiming the protesters are foreigners and only small in numbers, it does not take them 
seriously. In the moment the security services attack the demonstrations, the 
government lose its legitimacy. 
The people were desperate to be taken serious and wanted their demands to be 
treated in a respectful way. As a collective, a critical mass lost its trust into political 
institutions. At the same time, the government burned all bridges to its people. The 
small clique around Assad did lose touch to the Syrians and developed a deep mistrust 
against them. The political scene did largely disconnect from the rest of society (Harling 
and Birke 2013).
7
 
 
3.2.1 Summary 
In this section we argued, that one factor for the escalation of the Syrian conflict can be 
found in the pathologic trust-relation between the government, the people and vice 
versa. We showed that trust is built through a complex relation between individual trust 
and trust in political institutions – the latest cannot function without the first. Because of 
Assad's arrogant minority rule, and by mistrust marked fault-lines through the society, 
no lasting trust-relation could be established. The government was not willing to 
establish reforms and the political institutions were debilitated by corruption and 
particular interests. The weak civil society is one factor for the usually defective 
                                                 
7 Another indication for the leading clique having lost touch to the people is the fact that Assad mostly 
communicated to the nation via the Wall Street Journal (ICG 2011a: 5). 
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discourses about how things are in Syria. Because of these factors an appeasement was 
not possible in the beginning of the protests. Rather, the relationship marked by mistrust 
affected people to be fed up with the regime and to fight for a sustainable change. 
 
After we analyzed the nature of the Syrian society – in form of the ethnic division – and 
got an insight into the trust-relation in Syria we now should ask, if other factors 
eventually lead to the here discussed conflict. One other factor is identified in various 
forces located outside the Syrian society. Not only has the interest of other states 
contributed to the conflict and its escalation, but also regional and global phenomena. 
Regarding the first, the Arab Spring can be named, regarding the latter the global 
hegemony. These factors will be analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
3.3 External Actors and Factors 
Social conflicts appear when the government-nation social contract comes under 
pressure by particular internal and external forces. In the globalized world a successful 
state needs to have international respect, that is mainly the result of state‘s degree of 
cooperation with international organization and its responsibility towards international 
acceptable norms- moral, economic, and political. The global standard form of state is 
the democratic one, such a state can win the trust of international communities, which is 
necessary for development of other superstructures. An undemocratic state then would 
be under pressure of democratic states and global organizations to reform based on the 
standard democratic norms, as democracy is presented to be the every nation‘s right. 
 On the other hand we witness the struggle of old Ideologies in some regions- especially 
in the Middle East we can mention the Islamism - that resists the contradictory global 
democratic Ideology. Since Islamists try to spread the Islamic Ideology and norms 
regardless of the borders, it may not be strange to see the presence of external Islamic 
groups in oppressed society like Syria -with majority Muslims. 
So far, based on aforesaid, we assume that some external actors and factors play 
important roles in breaking out, extending and also solving the ongoing conflict. In this 
regards, uprisings in the Arab world impacts of global hegemony, foreign nations‘ 
strategies towards the internal situation of Syria, and intrusion of foreign Islamists and 
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Jihadists could be some of the distinctive external actors.  
 
Arab uprising 
The Arab Uprising refers to a series of social movements and revolutions in the Arab 
world in the end of 2010. The uprisings first started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, 
Libya and Syria. Calling these continues string of movements in the Middle East the 
Arab Uprising, pushed us to think how these movements could be the sparkles of 
initiation of the Syrian conflict.  
History, religion and language are the main issue that brought Arab countries to be 
identified as parts of the Arab world. This unification has led to the formation and share 
of unique Arab culture with specific collective memories. Erik Selbin highlights the 
roles of historical and collective memories as the main forces in a revolutionary process:  
 
―There is a societal memory, which is up for grabs, a battlefield where various 
groups struggle to protest and extend their interpretation of a society‟s past. Most 
resistance movements conceive of and understand their struggles as continuing 
some long process of struggle that many societies hold in their collective 
memories.‖ (As quoted by Foran 1997: 130f.) 
 
The past shows that Arabs are more successful when they act together and are more 
oppressed when they are divided. This is because of the historical memories and unity 
which is called Arabism (Hinnebusch 2009: 154). Therefore, there should be particular 
‗symbols‘ that define this powerful identification. Arab nationalism gets its power from 
religion and Arab genealogy and glories of Arab conquests, also Islam was brought by 
an Arab prophet with the Arabic holy Book (Kramer 1993: 174). The common 
language, along with, shared literature, history and similar cultural values might have 
intensified the impacts of the social changes of neighbor countries on Syria. Looking 
through history, Arab-ness, as a kind of strategy, was used to homogenize the scattered 
nation of Syria and to shape the national identities. Although this ideology of Arab 
nationalism was successful, Arab-ness of this imagined community attached the Syrians 
to other Arab language nations – emotionally and culturally if not politically. 
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―Their shared Arabic Culture and language and historical memories of unified 
Arab empires, critical ingredients of nationhood, are reflected in the very durable 
belief of many Arabs that they all constitute a nation whose fragmentation (one 
nation-many states) violate the nationalist norm of one nation - one state.‖ 
(Fawcett 2009:152) 
 
Hence, Arabism is not a matter of political identities in the states, but it is a result of 
shared threats, interests, and grievances against the non-Arab states and imperialism 
‗the other‘ (Fawcett 2009: 152). The Syrian government never managed to formate a 
powerful Syrian national identity over nation‘s Arab identity. Although, this community 
of Arab nation is imagined, it is real to the people and powerful enough to raise 
emotions, to sympathize with their suffering Arab ‗brothers‘ in Egypt and Tunisia. This 
identification is beyond boundaries. When movements in Tunisia and Egypt demanded 
specific claims from their governments, this hope of reformation might have provoked 
the Syrian opposition groups as well. Syrian protesters possibly compared their social 
conditions with Egyptians and Tunisians who had alike dictatorial regimes.  
 
Global Hegemony 
The growth in international relation led to Globalization, which can be understood as a 
world system that has encompassed the whole world, primarily aiming facilitation of 
capital investment and exchange of goods as well as labor among states. In the modern 
world, neo-liberalism is not just matter of economic reformation as it has great impacts 
on ideologies, cultural values and governances. The regimes internal and external 
politics is based on active national ideologies which themselves are result of creation 
and reproduction of realities. The transformation from local economy to open and 
global ones forces states to have a political reformation – one which is accepted by the 
international community. Furthermore, this political adaptation leads to change in 
strategies of dominant governance, which might result in changes in national 
constitution as well, because ―the economic life of subordinate nations is penetrated by 
and intertwined with that of powerful nations‖ (Cox 2005: 42). Since the use values are 
followed by exchange values, there can be a great impact of global values on social 
values- especially in cultural and political concerns – people‘s identification and their 
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taste- which can be traced in their comparison of their life style and degree of social 
freedom. In the Middle East, statehood and cultural values have had explicit difference 
with the ones of the West.  
The great powers‘ emphasis on homogenizing the world is based on the standard 
Human Right values – decided through UN organizations and imposed through Western 
powers‘ policies, for example the U.S. and Britain – may lead to challenges between 
regimes and nations, as the authoritarian dominance of weak regimes fade in clash of 
national hegemony with 'glamorous' global standard values – or rules. The interest of 
the people from the Middle East in Western democracy and individualized ‗Human 
Rights‘ and their demand from their governments to adapt the governing system and 
constitution with the standard global ones, have led to internal state-nation conflicts. 
Most Arab regimes are facing similar crises, which can be summarized as growing 
popular alienation and resentment fueled by neo-liberal reforms (Sidki 2011: 10).  
Many critics assume the inevitable cultural and political impacts of Globalization as 
a new form of hegemony that affects states‘ policies and hegemony, and also the 
process of identity formation and identification: ―In the Middle East, for strategic 
reasons (…), the spectrum of barriers [to the movement of capital, goods and labor 
between states] to be removed includes not just protectionist trade and monetary 
policies but the regimes as well‖ (Fawcett 2009: 105). On the one hand, the presence of 
the biggest oil fields of the world in the Middle East, which is a premise of ‗global 
industry‘, and on the other hand the defensive and closed state policies of Middle East 
countries towards Globalization, enforce the regime change strategy as well. In the case 
of a clash between a state‘s hegemony with global hegemony, the regimes legitimacy 
can be in danger and a change from within may happen. This is possible, when the state 
fails or refuses to adopt its policies – both internal and external – with standard Western 
perspectives, like the Human Right rules.  
If we consider the resistance of Syrian regime in political reformation and its attempt 
to oppress its oppositions, as well as the conflicts it had with supper powers, the process 
of regime change is plausible. Aijaz Ahmad (2002), who is a critic of Globalization 
notes in ‗Globalization and Culture‘ that Globalization is a new phase in the history of 
colonization, through which super powers have controlled and forced many nations to 
change. In this regards, governments face global pressures to apply economic and 
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political reformations, as, failure of state cause sectarian and ethnic groups mobilize 
based on the collectivities, attempting to achieve and change the power structure. 
In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad by coming to power was eager to apply economic 
reformation. But, his authoritarian plan of economic liberalization and modernization 
failed to transform the sectarian structure of the regime. In order to concentrate power, 
he backed up crony capitalist and gave political positions to the trusted elites: ―The most 
dangerous stage for an authoritarian regime is when it seeks to „reform‟, particularly 
when the path of reform combines neo-liberalism and crony capitalism‖ (Hinnebusch 
2012: 112). In Syria, only economic reforms took place. The domestic markets opened 
up for goods and investment. At the same time, the political dimension was not 
reformed. The regime did not allow more participation or further political parties. This 
one-sided development can be seen as one reason for the peoples' grievance. When the 
state failed to provide the requests of the people, the challenges continued and can led to 
armed conflict. One of the few possible solutions in this situation is the reestablishing of 
peace by global actors and organizations. Because of the lack of cooperation within the 
international powers' the conflict could not be solved. 
 
Intervention of Foreign Countries 
The present situation in Syria can also be examined through the state‘s international 
relations. Theory of Neoliberalism - it is not the neoliberal economy- a theory in the 
study of international relations, emphasize on significant role of state as a rational actor 
in international relations. Neoliberals point to the states‘ cooperation in resolution of 
problems -like social conflict and war- that need stats‘ collective action. However, 
through this perspective international politics is mainly matter of states‘ interests in the 
anarchical world (Oye 1985: 1ff.). 
In this regards, the positions and politics of international powers can be more 
comprehensible with game theoretical notion. Game Theory is a decision making 
approach which is based on rationality of the actors for achieving their goals (Beavis 
2013). In this regards, the international actors play an important role in the internal 
affairs of a state – as the case of a social conflict – the actors try to have more benefits 
and minimize their losses. Under this condition of uncertainty players estimate the 
probabilities, and consider what the other actors might do (ibid). In the Syrian conflict, 
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players with multiple roles take two contrary positions: one group supports the regime 
and another one backs the oppositions. In this two-sided n-actor game – just like any 
other game – one side ‗wins‘ and one side ‗loses‘. Furthermore, the conflict can be 
framed as a game with iterate rounds. A round can be considered as the different phases 
of the conflict – as mentioned in the conflict cycle model.   
In the global world interdependency of states has resulted in an interference of 
external agents in internal affairs of states. Obtaining international legitimacy demands 
states to have or pretend to have democratic principles to constitute human rights. 
Otherwise, undemocratic states might be under pressure of external forces. The 
undemocratic governance of the regime, important geopolitical situation of Syria and its 
role in the stabilization of power in the region, encouraged the foreign powers to 
increase their intervention in Syria. It is while, ―The fundamental rule of Westphalian/ 
Vatellian sovereignty is to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of other states. 
Each state has the right to determine its own domestic authority Structures‖ (Krasner 
2004: 88).  When Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, he promised economic 
reformation- what never followed with political reformation. As discussed before, 
Assad was eager to have economic relation with the West. However, his opposition with 
the Iraq war and having conflict with Israel resulted in hostility towards the West and 
U.S. (Hinnebusch 2012: 112). Then, to achieve economic prosperity the regime tended 
to Russia, China and the East. This shift in economic relations provided the regime 
political allies— Iran, Russia and China— which still are backing up the regime for the 
sake of their interests. The Assad regime‘s policies allowed specific powers to benefit in 
the region through strategic position of Syria. Since the other global competitors – with 
counter policies- were disadvantaged, they began to question the legitimacy of the 
regime by highlighting democratic deficiencies of the state. 
 
John Foran states that if ―outside powers supported rather than abandoned incumbent 
[regimes],‖ (Foran 1997: 251) movements might not succeed. Since the outbreak of the 
conflict, the Syrian people have faced a catastrophic human right crisis. One reason 
therefor is the contradictory positions of the foreign countries. Strategic positions of 
foreign countries towards the conflict have turned Syria into a kind of strange 
chessboard: On the one side, we find the Assad regime and its supporters. Iran, Russia 
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and Lebanon; and on the other side, the oppositional parties with distinctive support by 
the U.S., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey or European countries. In this regard, the 
present situation in Syria may be considered as a (world political) struggle for 
transforming or keeping the balance of power in the region. 
We now provide a short overview of the situations- the roles of Iran, Hezbollah, 
Russia and China on one side, and the U.S. the West and Turkey on the other side. By 
means of this overview, we show why the states act as they do- instead of cooperating 
to solve the conflict- and what their interests are: 
 
Iran 
In the region, Iran has shown to be the steadiest supporter of Assad regime, as its 
existence plays an important role in Iran‘s strategies against Israel, and support of the 
Hezbollah army in Lebanon. Moreover, the Alawite minority is affiliated to the Shi'ite 
sect, and since the Iran is ruled by Shi'ite elites they try to save their ally against the 
majority of Sunnis – which are supported by other regional Arab countries. At the same 
time, Syria is one of the few Arab countries that have ally bonds with Iran in the region. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries regard Iran as a ―mortal enemy and is 
to be resisted on all fronts‖ (Hykel 2013: 5).  
The scenario of losing Syria would have the consequence of weakening Iran's 
strategic encounter with Israel and the U.S. By this strategy, the Iran gains internal 
legitimacy. The Iranian leader do not pause to highlight the pureness of the Islamic 
regime and danger of the 'devilish' ideologies and politics of the West and the U.S. 
Religious and political elites define Israel, the U.S. and some Western states – Britain – 
as modern Imperialists who attempts to destroy the Islamic regime and Islamic values. It 
is by this stance, that the Iranian regime succeeded to repress its domestic opponents – 
especially in the Green Movement of 2009. The simple equation is, whoever is against 
the regime's ideology is a traitor to God, the home country and the people of Iran 
(Marantz 2012). 
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Hezbollah 
The relation between Syria and Lebanon are much deeper than only the obligatory 
diplomatic bonds, as these two Arab nations have shared historical memories of the 
Colonial Era, and follow common socio-political interests. Hezbollah is an active Shi'ite 
Militia and a political party that succeeded to play a significant role in governing 
Lebanon with apparent support from Iran. Considering other Assad supporters, Iran and 
Hezbollah are the prominent ones. The core reason for this close relationship is 
maintaining a regional balance of power, as collapse of the regime endangers their 
counter position towards Israel. Hezbollah has, also, received Iran‘s military support 
through Syria. Furthermore, a sectarian fear of emerging of a Sunni dominated new 
Syria, which can result in being caught between it and Lebanon‘s own Sunni 
Community (ICG 2011: 4), arouse Hezbollah to use its potentials in support of the ally 
regime.  
 
Russia and China 
Russia has played the role of a diplomatic big brother for the Assad regime. It favors the 
Assad government and defended this position in the UN Security Council. One related 
question is, why Russia has applied a different position towards the Assad regime, in 
contrast with Western powers‘ position? One reason may be the prediction of 
governance of the Sunni-Islamists and extremists in case of falling of Assad regime, as 
the region may become insecure. This scenario would also affect the Islamist networks 
in the Caucasian region. Another reason is, Russia's resistance towards the growing 
influence and power of the U.S. in the Middle East. As it is evident, Syria is one of the 
few countries in the Middle East that is allied with Russia; the downfall of the Assad 
regime would shrink the Russia‘s political and economic relation in the Middle East. As 
mentioned, Russia guarded Assad in the UN Security Council. It repetitively voted 
against a military intervention of the West. Which Russia understands as an interference 
of external forces for regime change (Allison 2013: 795ff.). Russia‘s argues that 
following an external invasion ―the occupying powers, most obviously the United States, 
were then confronted with the challenges of fashioning decent governance structures‖ 
(Krasner 2004: 90). 
China also tried to have a cautious strategy toward the Syrian crisis. Following the 
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UN charter, China emphasizes that foreign states must not use force for solving a state‘s 
internal conflict. During the crisis, China has used its veto power thrice to prevent 
military intervention. This behavior cannot be seen as altruistic, but mirrors Chinas 
attempts to protect their interests in Syria. However, China‘s position prevents the 
establishment of a norm of outside intervention of powerful democratic countries in 
internal affairs of other states. Especially of non-democratic states – such as China 
(Swaine 2012: 9f.). A further reason for Chinas behavior is its strive to restrict U.S. 
domination in Asia and the Middle East so it can compete the Western influences to 
create its own hegemony. 
 
The U.S. and the West 
Syria's confrontation with the U.S. became evident when Syria‘s peace process with 
Israel collapsed and furthermore, by its opposition to the occupation of Iraq. The 
insistence of the Syrian government to support Hezbollah has threatened Israel which is 
the main ally of the U.S. in the region. A possible regime change in Syria would not 
only weaken Hezbollah and secures Israel from possible invasion of Iran, but also leads 
to the creation of new government that respects the interests of the U.S. which would 
lead to a strengthening of its position in the Middle East. Concerning its support for 
Assad's opposition, the U.S. and other Western countries facing one problem. Due to the 
increasing number of Islamists joining the ranks, the Western allays became cautious 
not to equip the fundamentalists with (heavy) weapons. The – not unrealistic – fear is, 
that a similar situation of unpredictable terrorist acts, as experienced in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, will appear. (ICG 2013: 9). Although, Western states‘ positions are more 
'humanitarian' driven and they worry about further human crisis in Syria, they back up 
their allies to weaken the Hezbollah Militia and to keep control over the international 
influence of Islamic Iran. 
 
Turkey  
Since the conflict emerged, Turkey declared its support for the opposition and their 
demands. When Assad regime used its army and tanks to repress the opposition, Turkey 
showed positive response to Assad's opponents and supported their fight by hosting 
different oppositional conferences and giving asylum to activists and allowing 
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thousands of Syrian refugees to house in tents near to the Turkish border. Just like other 
interfering countries, Turkey also seeks its interests in Syrian conflict, as the most 
prominent ones are Turkey‘s demands to increase its regional power and its concerns 
about the Kurds.  
Turkey is interested in expanding its regional power and proliferate its relations with 
Arab countries. Supporting the Sunni-Arab opposition resulted in gaining respect by the 
Arab world. If the Alawite regime would fall, Iran‘s power over Syria and the Middle 
East would shrink. In turn, this would help Turkey to gain a greater interest in post-
Assad Syria and to establish a strong relation with Arab countries. 
Moreover, Turkey has deep-rooted problems with the Kurds population in its 
country, as they demand more independence. In 2010, Turkish officials succeeded to 
have an agreement with PKK – the Kurdistan Workers Party (Sidki 2011: 29) to give 
more rights to Kurds and in response they should not challenge the regime. However, by 
the expansion of the Syrian conflict, Assad's regime allowed the Democratic Union 
Party – the Syrian Kurds – to have free activities in Kurdistan regions and to employ 
new fighters (ibid). This move of the Syrian regime aimed to restrict the conflict just to 
the Sunni-Arab side, so it could suppress them easier. As an unintended side effect, it 
arose the Turkish reaction. It is afraid of the Syrian PKK could provoke the Kurds in 
Turkey to run military operations against Turkish forces.  
 
The Arab Countries – Saudi Arabia and Qatar  
Since the Arab uprisings the leaders from the GCC especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
have had distinct reactions to the events. But, most generally, they kept their own 
individual style of rule. These states, because of their political system and shared Arab 
cultural values, have all tried to keep the forces of revolutionary changes away from 
their own societies. They have sought to maintain the domestic status- that is political 
domination over their citizens.  
Saudi Arabia and Qatar tried to raise their stakes in the Middle East by means of 
their wealth. By intervening in to the events, they seek to gain more weight as 
international actors. In addition, they try to secure and achieve their internal policies and 
legitimacy. Qatar and Saud Arabia have been interested in the revolutionary change in 
Syria, while they, at the same time,  criticized the Bahrain opposition and protected the 
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monarchy there. It is Ironic that they do not reform their internal conservative policies, 
while they try to interfere in the process of political reformation of the region, ignoring 
the fact that their support for reform elsewhere may encourage domestic opposition to 
react to their autocratic rule. The two countries have become active agents of political 
change in Syria; they have cooperated on some fronts and differed on others. For 
example, they both seek to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Haykel 
2013: 1), while they have disagreements over supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Both 
countries, aim at weakening the regional non-Arab states, such as Iran – Assad's biggest 
supporter. The Iran is also a thread to them because of its access to nuclear technology 
and possibilities to create a nuclear weapon. 
 
Intrusion of Islamists and Extremists 
Another key factor that has moved the Syrian conflict to its current stage is the presence 
of Takfiries, Islamists and al-Qaeda combatants in Syria. Islam is the dominant religion 
in the Middle East that has had important role in formation of socio-cultural values and 
world-views of the people. Salafis are the distinctive Islamists who fight actively 
against Assad‘s regime. These groups aim is to return back to the practice of the earliest 
Islam and their slogan is Islam is the solution (Richards 2002: 2). The Islamists, the 
other side of extremist groups, believe in that the state‘s politics and social rules should 
be based on the Islamic law (sharia).  
Overall, it is more likely to see people of a nation struggle for reformation or change 
of the regime, but witnessing the presents of outsiders who leave their land and families 
to fight in another country for religious beliefs is regarded as astonishing: ―Haven‘t 
(sic!) these Muslims read Fukuyama‘s End of History (1992). Don‘t they understand his 
pronouncio declaring that the only route to modernity is the neo-liberal democratic path 
under global capitalism?‖ (Lubeck 1999: 4). By conceptualizing Enlightenment, 
understanding the concept of ‗global Islam‘ may be contradictory. In the process of 
Globalization the Islamic societies are 'anti-globalization' – because of difference in the 
Islamic ideology and global ideology — which is based on capitalism. Islam offered 
Muslims a universal identity of belonging to an Islamic community, the ‗Umma‘– an 
identity that is the matter of an imagined Islamic community regardless of boundaries, 
nationality, ethnicity, language, race and time. Although Islamists are anti-‗Western 
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consumerism‘, they use modern technologies to distribute global Islamic message 
(Lubeck 1999: 8). If we consider the secular dimension of Globalization that emphasize 
on the Human Rights values as an enlightenment burden, - and not the religious ones- 
then we see its clash with global Islam.  
In spite of the emphasis of Muslims on their worldwide unity, there is a contradiction 
between two Islamic sects in the region, Shi'ite and Sunni. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are 
the main supporters of Arab Sunni-Muslims and Iran is the supporter of the Shi'ite. 
Therefore, it is possible to see the Syrian conflict as a conflict between Shi'ite and 
Sunni. Groups of Salafis, Sunni-Muslims and extremists of different shades entered 
Syria in order to fight for the fall of the regime and to establish a new government and 
institutions based on Islamic law. President Assad declares in his speech on January 6. 
2013, that the oppositional forces who are fighting against regime, are not the Syrians 
but are Takfiris, terrorists and al-Qaeda members (al-Assad January 6. 2013). 
Furthermore, he states that it is the government‘s right to defend itself against acts of 
terrorism. Considering Bashar al-Assad statement, the Islamists have violated the 
territorial entities of Syria and are criticized of performing terrorist act by evolving in 
the armed conflict. The opposition, at the same time, has the problem to keep its 
legitimacy towards the West, which crumbles because of the Islamists. 
 
3.3.1 Summary 
The traces and impacts of external actors and factors in the outbreak of the Syrian 
conflict are evident. In spite of international agreements regarding non-interference of 
foreign forces in domestic affairs of a state, we can observe that since the breaking out 
of the Syrian conflict, powerful regional and international states and forces for 
protection or achievement of their interests have had contradictory positions. Some of 
the actors backed up the regime and some condemned it to regime change – by 
supporting the oppositions financially, politically, and by equipping them with weapons. 
These contradictory positions of international powers toward legitimizing and 
delegitimizing Assad regime for the sake of their own concerns can be considered as a 
dangerous game that has added to complexity of the conflict. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion 
 
Based on the multi-dimensional analysis, we have gained the understanding that no 
single variable is responsible for the brutal escalation of the Syrian conflict. The reason 
for this is that the situation in Syrian is complex and has several dimensions affecting 
the Syrians‘ social life. Since the social conflict is a multi-faceted phenomenon, its 
understanding required a multi-dimensional analysis. Only through the analysis of the 
interplay between domestic, regional and global factors, we now can discuss a credible 
answer to our research-question. Accordingly, to not re-narrate the events of the 
escalation in chronological order proved to be the right approach. Only the 
deconstruction of the events provides the needed insights. By applying this approach, 
we got the ability to analyze the facts from different theoretical point of views.  
The ongoing conflict can be regarded as the sum of different consecutive phases and 
the failure of resolving the conflict led to the next higher phases of escalation. 
Therefore, one outcome of the analysis is the fact that at different stages of the process, 
driven by diverse influences, different impacts play a role: the ethnic differentiation is 
the societies basic ground and is one factor of the mistrustful relation in between 
Syrians and the political institutions. The latter was the most important factor on the eve 
of the escalation. Without trust in the security forces and in the capability of political 
actors to bring change, the people realize that reforms would not lead to a fundamental 
change. This skepticism of change by reforms catalyzes the people‘s urge to topple the 
regime. The international forces stepped in after the mass mobilization already took 
place and the armed conflict erupted. By strong support for Assad's as well as for the 
oppositional forces, the international backers fuel the already smoldering conflict.   
 
In all three analysis sections, it became clear to us that Syria‘s historical background, 
the consistency of Syrian society and the relations between Syrians are among some of 
the most crucial elements for explaining the escalation of the ongoing conflict. The 
absence of a common will and values in relation to ethnic belonging, people‘s relation 
to their government and the political system has caused an atmosphere of mistrust and 
suspicious in the Syrian society. The mentioned lack of trust has weakened the power 
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and assertiveness of Syrian‘s institutions – political as well as societal, it affected the 
interaction between institutions and caused instability and insecurity. Taking into 
account how Syrians interact with each other and with the political system, the Syrian 
society has a fragile socio-political structure and was already prone to a potential 
conflict before it occurs.  
In regards of the processual character of the protests, we could show that the reasons 
and the actual outbreak of demonstration are rooted in more or less long existing 
structures. The Arab Uprising, as a source of inspiration, certainly contributed to the 
events in an important way. At the same time, the societal conditions and an increasing 
male functioning of political institutions set the ground for the people‘s willingness to 
risk their lives in the streets. 
What became clear in the analysis of the trust-relation is that not the weak trust-
bonds between the people is the major problem regarding our case, but the resulting 
dysfunctional political institutions. In the moment the crisis emerged in the beginning of 
2011, Syria's political institutions were not able to contribute to a possible appeasement. 
When the first protest broke out, Assad, with some hesitation, promised political and 
economic reforms to silence the opposition. Because of the widespread mistrust in the 
ability to apply change, the protesters became even angrier – and demonstrations grow 
in number and insensitivity. At the moment of the conflicts gestation, the ethnic 
cleavages did not play the major role. The overall feeling was to overcome the shared 
fear and fight the regime together (ICG 2011a: 8). 
 
Furthermore, we argue, that the Arab Uprising has played an important role as an 
external factor for the gestation and mobilization of the conflict. At first, it was a source 
of inspiration for the outbreak of the first protests. It gave people hope that a political 
change is possible in Syria too (as it did in Egypt and Tunisia). Combined with the 
domestic grievances, the time was right for demonstrations and hoped that Assad would 
step down. On the other side, Assad too became inspired by the Arab Uprising: the 
outcome of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and the way Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and Hosni Mubarak acted, warned him. Therefore, he took an opposite approach and 
denied to abdicate and decides to employing all means in quelling and fighting the 
protest movement. Obviously, Assad's approach to manage the conflict failed. He and 
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his regime responded to a peaceful social movement by the use of violence and met 
demands of protests ruthlessly. Assad attempted to re-employ his father‘s approach of 
controlling conflicts, without having in mind that the situation is much different now. 
As an outcome of the Arab Uprising, the political structures in many countries in the 
region changed or at least experienced challenges. The Syrian society, divided more 
than ever, realized the regimes lack of legitimacy, as did parts of the international 
community. Even for some Alawites which generally supported the al-Assad family, it 
was time to enter the protests. Not only the political situation changed, so did the 
technological possibilities: could Hafez beat down previous protests without anyone 
noticing, todays protesters are equipped with mobile phone cameras and connected via 
social media (ICG 2011a: 10). Many protesters themselves became amateur reporters 
reflecting the events. When the first footage of security member violating peaceful 
protesters were published, the reaction was a deepening of the crisis – and not, as 
intended, a way to end it.  
 
As we can see, the regime used the army and security forces throughout the gestation 
and mobilization of the protest to beat the protest down. Now, two years after the 
breakout of the uprising it shows that the strategy failed all along the line. In 
consequence, the regime‘s brutal overreaction and the use of blunt violence lifted the 
protest and the reaction of the movement to a new stage. This is the context, in which 
the mobilization of the conflict took place: the transition from a peaceful protest with 
moderate demands to an armed conflict. In this phase of the conflict, the opposition 
changed its way to organize. They had do decide to keep on with the mostly peaceful 
protest and to be killed one after the other or to react violently. As we could see, they 
have chosen the latter possibility. The different protest groups started to organize 
weapons and other supplies. Here, backers of Assad's troops and the oppositional forces 
play an important role in form of supply networks. Now, the opposition also mobilized 
troops and formed units. In the same time, the protester's demands too changed: they did 
not ask for reforms anymore but demand the regime to leave. As the response was even 
more violent, the oppositional forces changed to a violent approach too and openly 
attack the enemy. The opportunity for dialogue and peaceful deliberation between 
involving parties passed by unconsidered. The emergence and metastasizing of the 
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armed conflict has destroyed all hope for a peaceful solution. Has a conflict arrived in 
this phase, it is difficult to return to the pre-conflict conditions or to negotiate a 
compromise. In this situation, the role of the Syrian army and the security forces in 
escalation the situation becomes undeniable. The forces are ruled by the al-Assad clan 
and fellow Alawite officers, therefore, the majority of soldiers at first stayed loyal to the 
regime. Accordingly, the army became a determinative factor during this phase of the 
conflict. In contrast to, for example Egypt, the army leaders decide to stay on the 
regimes side and to fight the own population. Consequentially, the army bears a certain 
consequence for the escalation. 
 
By using force against protesters and its inability to phasing out the conflict the regime 
lost obviously its legitimacy for large parts of society. As we mentioned, an autocracy 
has an inbuilt problem with legitimacy. The representation of very narrow interests, 
bold corruption and the ruthless usage of the security forces – also before the 
demonstration started, are few reasons for the lack of legitimacy. In terms of the trust-
approach, mistrust leads to a dysfunctional civil society, which in turn hinders the 
antagonized groups to channel their demands – this can, in consequence, results in an 
even deeper reservation against each other. Here, the lack of democratic institutions 
becomes evident. The trust-literature largely consists out of how trust can be sustained, 
also it shows that it can be – through limited – applied for the question how trust can be 
established in the first place, respectively, what factors needed to be present for a 
pathologic trust-relation. As mentioned, a stable civil society is important to support the 
development of a healthy or at least functioning trust-relation. Furthermore, without 
individual trust it is not possible to establish trust on the political level and without 
social trust and a functioning civil society, individual trust is difficult to establish. The 
Syrian society failed in breaking through this paradoxical situation.  
Beyond elements like contradictory ethnic collective values and interests, different 
religious belonging and institutional failure, the role of external factors and actors are 
other element we deliberated in this project. External actors have been identified in 
many ways, including global hegemony, and neo-liberal values and direct foreigner‘s 
interference in the conflict. Therefore, external actors among dominant and regional 
powers in many ways contributed to the escalation and therefore complexity of the 
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conflict. In the early stages, which are the gestation as well as the mobilization of the 
conflict, the international community acted very slowly and cautious. Therefore, an 
effective conflict resolution did not take place. The international interest was too low. 
From the moment the interest arises, the engagement of the international community 
into the conflict is marked by mutual blocking and contradictory conception of Syria's 
future. The schism mainly runs along two blocks: one block consists of the U.S., 
Britain, Turkey and most of the Sunni-Muslim states in the region supporting opposition 
groups, the second block consists of Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah supporting the 
Syrian regime. These two blocks, each supporting one of the two main parts, have been 
involving in the Syrian conflict. The U.S. led camp, on the one side, supports different 
opposition groups financially as well as by sending military equipment and assists them 
in organizing fighting the regime. On the other side, Russia supports the regime by 
many ways. Amongst others it gives political support, for example avoiding UN 
resolutions or prevents any kind of military intervention against the regime. 
Furthermore, it supplies the regime by military and logistical means. Iran and Hezbollah 
too are sending troops and have a direct participation in both protecting Assad and 
supporting him in fighting oppositional groups.  
 
What makes the conflict even more escalated is the external actors‘ different conception 
of the conflict and the way they contribute to it. Even if the countries in each block 
seem to be ally with each other, their interaction with each other is outshined by 
controversies. They even have difficulties to find a common ground of values they 
support. For example, they are disagreeing in ways of supporting oppositional groups 
and in the use of means or methods for phasing out the conflict. The actors 
disagreements within each other can be understand as they each have their own agenda, 
interests and concerns. Some external actors, among them Saudi Arabian and Qatar, are 
supporting fundamentalist jihadist opposition groups.
8
 On their payroll are also extreme 
and intolerant groups following an exclusive approach and radical understanding of 
Islam. Therefore, the emerging and rise of Islamist jihadist groups in Syria worsened the 
conflict in many ways. The reason is manifold: if they act under the umbrella of the 
Syrian oppositions, their action will damage the legitimacy and reputation of Syrian‘s 
                                                 
8 Very recently, the U.S. and Britain stopped an overall support of the oppositional forces, because they are afraid that their 
weapons and other supplies will be captured by the increasingly powerful jihadist forces. 
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opposition by many levels (for example domestic, regional and internationally), another 
case is that they started to fight oppositional forces as well as the regime. This partially 
tripartition of the fronts during the armed conflict even contributes more complexity to 
the conflict. In long terms, the presence of jihadist in Syria contributes to instability and 
insecurity not just in Syria but also in the whole region. In general, the external actors‘ 
different values and ways of acting have a determinant significance for the conflict‘s 
extension, direction and duration.                 
 
Another topic we came across in our analysis, regards the question of to what extend a 
national identity exists in Syria. We argued that because of the colonial history of Syria 
and the largely divided society, a shared feeling of national unity and being a Syrian 
does only exist to a small degree. 
  
It is not only matter of the ethnic and religious diversity, but also the failure of the 
regime to apply a successful strategy to unify the nation. When a government fails to 
form powerful sense of national identity, people seek other sources to identify 
themselves with. The substitutions of the national identity for Syrians then are religious 
and ethnic identities. Furthermore, a possible national identity is contested by an Arab 
nationalism. Nevertheless, the society gave proof of their capability to act together – at 
least for a brief moment. Therefore, we can – to a certain extend – reject the notion of 
the not existing of national identity. Such an identity exists – but only in a specific way. 
Syrians identity consists out of many different layers. Because of the colonial history 
and the society‘s ethnic division, a shared feeling of national identity could not fully 
develop. At the same time did the Syrians show, that they are capable of acting together 
as a nation, at least for a short period of time. The national identity is contested by 
ethnic belonging and Arab-nationalism.  
 
Globalization has affected the international relations, states‘ ruling system and 
ideologies, cultural realities and individuals‘ self-understanding. Before the emergence 
of the global era in the 1980s, states had more authority as they could homogenize their 
nation through naturalization of national identity and formation of its people‘s national 
identity through practicing national norms and values. There used to be less impacts of 
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foreign ideologies and cultural values on a nation and boundaries used to be more 
imaginable. States could act – and interact with their citizens, without considering 
impacts of foreign ideologies and cultural values on their own constitution or its people. 
Although, a state encompassed sub-cultures, there was a hegemonic national culture that 
could connect them all by forming people‘s individual and social self-understanding, so 
a nation could distinguish themselves from the other nations. A nation like Syria that is 
the artifact of colonial powers in late 19
th
 century, compared to other regional nations, 
can be regarded as a younger nation that since its formation has lacked a qualified 
government to homogenize the nation and develop a powerful sense of national identity. 
Weakness of national identity empowered the rooted collective-ethnic and religious- 
identities to be regarded as main unquestionable realities and source of the members‘ 
self-understandings. It is evident that the Syrian regime‘s attempt to unify this scattered 
nation has failed under the shade of global forces.  
 
In a global world, states need a mighty government to protect and achieve nation‘s 
security, interests and goals. Such a government demands both internal legitimacy and 
international respect. The undemocratic governance of Assad‘s regime – share of power 
among Bashar al-Assad trusted elites, who are mostly members of the Alawite sect – 
and its failure of economic and political reformation led to dissatisfaction of people. 
When the people‘s march - demanding reformation – was treated violently by army, 
protesters lost their – already fragile – trust in the regime. When a regime loses its 
internal legitimacy, it will be under pressure of powerful democratic states and 
international organizations to reform or to resign, in order to prevent humanitarian crisis 
resulting from the social conflict. 
Globalization and economic liberalization have increased interdependency of states, 
this fact permit powerful foreign states interfere in internal affairs of weak nations. As 
we have discussed, because of the geopolitical importance of Syria, regional and global 
powers struggle to keep and gain their interests since the breaking out of the conflict. 
The group of international forces supporting the Assad regime worries to lose interest. 
The other camp tries to gain impact, by backing the oppositional forces. A situation, that 
can be compared to a chessboard game in which some states support Assad‘s regime 
and some backup the oppositions. International powers‘ struggle for specific interests 
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led to negligence of the moral aspect of human crisis. Therefore, efforts of Human 
Rights organizations and UN are hopeless since they lack appropriate cooperation of 
international powers in process of peace making.  
 
As we could see, the Syrian conflict has run through all phases mentioned in Miall's 
conflict cycle model, but not the post conflict. Unfortunately, the situation does not look 
like a fast peace is in sight. The number of actors and their different interests, plus in 
this project discussed factors make it difficult to imagine a possible end. Meanwhile, 
one should not forget that while providing abstract explanations real persons suffer and 
die in the moment of writing this line. 
Even if the opposition manages to topple Assad, peace is not assured: the different 
stakeholder can continue to fight for power and if the international community 
maintains their strategy, the situation could exacerbate – and the conflict cycle starts 
again.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we draw a conclusion based on the insights we won out of our analysis and 
discussion – to express our own perceptions of the conflict in Syria. Because of the project‘s 
methodological approach, we provide a conclusion with the possibility for further 
understandings and outcomes, if different data becomes available or different theories are 
applied. This conclusion will be an answer of our initial stated research question:  
 
―How can elements of ethnicity, people-government relation and the role of 
external actors give an understanding for the escalation of the Syrian conflict?‖ 
 
We conclude that Syria is a polarized society and the escalation of the conflict is rooted in many 
factors. Ethnic differentiation and religion dissent, the mutual lack of trust between the Syrian 
society and political institutions, and finally, the external actors‘ interference in the Syrian conflict – 
through strong support for Assad's as well as for the oppositional forces – are among some of the 
main reasons for escalation of the conflict. We now can give an explanation – with keeping the 
mentioned conditions – for the four phases from the conflict cycle model the Syrian conflict has 
been through, respectively is in the moment.  
During the last years and in some instances decades, the Syrian society was vulnerable to 
conflict. Not only had the ethnic and religious division of the society but also the autocratic police 
state, ruled by a small and greedy clan, provided the grounds for an upheaval. In the moment of 
economic crisis, the Arab Spring mixed with eagerness for change and a growing number of people 
doubting Assad's legitimacy. The gestation of the conflict begins. The government had, caused by 
pathologic trust-relations between Syrians and the political institutions, limited possibilities to act. 
In consequences, the government could not – and often enough was not willing to – meet the rising 
demands from different regions of the country. Inspired by the events in the Middle East, the first 
demonstrations, and thereby the mobilization of the conflict took place. Although, they were 
peaceful, the security forces start to attack them. This behavior can also be linked to the states 
inability to interact with its society. Also, it can be linked to the ethnic composition and especially 
to the leadership of the security forces. Foremost led by Alewite officers, and having ranks filled 
with loyal figures, the forces had a crucial role during this phase. Opposed to Egypt, it is less 
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courageous. In comparison to Syria, Egypt has many socio-political features in common with the 
here discussed case (Stacher 2012). Despite the differences, the army played a crucial role during 
the protests. Because of its intervention, the conflict could be stopped in its mobilization and did not 
grow to a complete armed conflict. Therefore, the Egypt's could held democratic elections and 
succeed in changing the former regime.  
 
In Syria, inflamed by the regimes ruthless reaction to the protest, the conflict grows bigger. Most 
Syrians lacked of trust, were fatigue of stagnation, and stopped believing in change and 
consequently demands a new government. Unfortunately, the political opposition in Syria had 
neither training in deliberation, nor developed organizations or a public base. Combined with the 
ethnic-cleavage and the brutal police, the odds for a mild outcome were small. In result, the 
opposition developed combat units and armed itself with help from supply networks in the 
neighborhood countries – the armed phase of the conflict begins. Here, the third identified factor, 
the international dimension of the conflict, becomes relevant. Due to the growing upheaval parts of 
the international community doubt Assad's legitimacy, and a schism along supporter and enemies 
takes place. The conflict increase on the one hand though the international backing of supplying 
military and political help for either sides, on the other hand through the blockade of the global 
political arena. Their opposed interests in the region and the political power balance hindered a 
diplomatic solution. Furthermore, the pressure through (quasi) global norms as neo-liberalism adds 
to the already complex interplay of domestic and global factors. The escalation of the Syrian 
conflict is a collage of different directly and indirectly interacting actors and factors. 
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Chapter 6. Perspective 
 
In this perspective we present two interesting subjects for possible further projects: 
peace-keeping and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and a comparison study.  
 
After we dealt with the escalation, it might be interesting to turn to the resolution of the 
conflict – which lies in the field of conflict management. In September 2013, the U.S. 
and Russia agreed to destroy Syria's estimated thousand tons of chemical munitions. 
This decision has many reasons: Destroying Syrian‘s chemical weapons became 
relevant after the regime in August 2013 attacked a rebel suburb of Damascus with them 
and killed hundreds of people. The regimes use of chemical weapons triggered 
international reaction: the U.S. for example, threatened the Syrian regime with a 
military attack. The international community wants to prevent a proliferation of the 
chemical weapons and minimize the danger of them falling in the hands of terrorist 
groups. Furthermore, they want to avoid the regime as well as oppositional groups to 
use it against civilians (Politiken 2013). 
It is planned, to destroy the large arsenal of chemical weapons on a ship out in the sea. 
This process will be executed as a UN-operation, lead and carried out by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It will get assistance 
by Western countries, among them Denmark and Norway. Danish and Norwegian 
military-unites will support the UN-Team by protecting it and supply it with their expert 
knowledge. Furthermore, the al-Assad regime too will be a part of the resolution. As a 
part of it, the Syrian regime is asked to cooperate during this disarming process with 
different UN non-state agencies and the OPCW, to allow access to its chemical 
installation and ensure safety for these agencies (ibid). This cooperation between states 
and non-state actors (International Organizations) is very interesting. Are international 
organizations able to act in a crisis situation without potent state actors or do they have 
their own agenda and possibilities to enforce it? Such questions could be answered in a 
further project.  
According to many experts on conflict management and experts on chemical weapon 
disarmed, the implementation of this program will face different kinds of challenges. 
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Removing the chemical weapons, especially because of their location, is very risky and 
sensitive. Such a process has never been done during a war, especially in a war zone 
like the Syrian. The Syrian chemical installations are spread in a broad geographical 
area and some of the installations are close to the front lines (Gollom 2013). Providing 
security for the UN-Team during the operation is the most challenging security issue. 
Another question touches element of reliability of the Syrian regime to cooperate and its 
willingness to let the installation become removed and destroyed completely without 
hiding parts of it. Financing the resolution is one another challenging factor. Who will 
pay for such an operation? 
 
Among many other possible topics, a further project can deal with a comparison study. 
In such a study, the outcome of the here discussed problem can be compared with the 
situation in for example Egypt or Libya. Both countries witnessed and still witness 
upheaval and conflict, but the situation did not escalate in the same sense as in Syria. By 
applying a comparative study it is possible to highlight the reasons for the escalation of 
the Syrian conflict, by showing how events took place elsewhere.    
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